Once upon a time there used to be a wild moody white sea in the hearth of the blue planet. On the north coast of the sea there was the kingdom of Eurapia, a kingdom of infinite green fertile lands and hard working people. On the south coast of the sea however, was situated another kingdom, the kingdom of Arapia, a land of endless charming sand and generous people. Eurapians never saw any Arapians in their life, and Arapians only heard about Eurapians from the stories reported by the sailors. Yet, every night both people would sit in front of the sea to watch the lights coming from the other shore and tell stories of monsters, ogres and tyrants living on the other side.

The Land of Eurapia has witnessed many wars in order to get united and lost many young men and women. Therefore, the kingdom needed workers to cultivate the soil and harvest the land otherwise the wheat fields will be spoiled. On the other part of the sea, drought hit the lands of Arapia for years and its numerous populations started facing the danger of starvation. Both kingdoms started thinking about solutions to avoid the misfortune that came to perturb their peaceful lives in the White Sea, but were unable to find sustainable solutions.

The Eurapian king had a beautiful and wise daughter called Sofia who came to him one day and said: “The wheat fields are getting spoiled and the only solution is to hire Arapian workers to save our kingdom”. The king turned red in anger and said: “How you dare to say that! Arapians are barbarians they invaded our land in the past, they imposed their Gods and stole our treasures. These people are backward bloody creatures who cover the faces of their women and kill with their swords whoever wants to approach them.” Sofia was chocked by her father’s reaction, and said before living the royal hall: “I hope that you will not let prejudice blinding you, and sacrifice your people for your fears”.

The Arapian king also had an intelligent lovely daughter called Hikmat, who tried to convince her father that the only way to save Arapia from starvation is to trade with the northern neighbors, but the king screamed in rage: “I don’t want to hear this subject anymore. Have you forgotten what their ancestors did to us? They attacked our lands, killed our men and separated our tribes. These people are arrogant greedy creatures who let their girls run naked and enslave who ever go to their lands.” Hikmat felt very sorry for her father’s attitude, and said in bitterness: “I know you are a wise king, so don’t let your stereotypes influence your judgment”.

Sofia and Hikmat sit each on her shore morning the fate of their people and picturing the obscure future of their dear lands. After hours of tears and sending smoke messages to each other as they used to do since they were kids, the two girls decided that it is high time to take action, so they started sailing with their small boats against the deadly waves of the sea until they reached the midway between the two kingdoms. However, before living to the unknown the princesses left a note to their people saying: “Beloved people, we decided to scarify our lives and to sail until the midway between the two kingdoms and remain there without food or water because we trust in our common future and that we can’t survive without getting together with our neighbors. If you want to save us and save your selves, you will have to build a bridge across the White Sea each from your side as a prove of your will to overcome your mutual prejudice and go further together”.

Two days have passed and the two kingdoms gathered all their wise men, armies and councilors to find a solution and save the princesses, but the two armies were tired of endless wars and the wise men weak because of the lack of food, so they both decided that they have nothing to lose and that they should take the risk of trusting the other and finally building the bridge between Eurapia and Arapia.

In a traditional café in old Amman we were a band of friends laughing around apple chicha and lemon mint juice. The conversation is about identity and local dialects and each one of the Moroccan, Lebanese, Egyptian, Turkish and Palestinian friends are making jokes about how classical Arabic is becoming sterile in expressing our emotions and our changing identities, until Karim, an Egyptian film maker, took out his green Egyptian passport and tears off a page and start writing on it all the funny jokes we were making. What Karim did was a symbolic action that made me think about my identity and question the notion of reducing all what I am in a miserable travel document.

I set on my bed yesterday gazing at my green passport, remembering what Karim did and searching in every single line and shape for my identity, but was unable to find it. How could my name, my place of birth and my age determine who I am. Am I just a number in the lists of the Moroccan ministry of interior and the Schengen database. Is it said anywhere in my passport that I am a big dreamer, that I spend my nights whispering to the polar star, that I love Sufi songs or that I hate onions? So how could my being be summed up in this miserable travel document, and why do I need all the visas and the stamps of the world to move into a Mediterranean apace to which I belong? For a Moroccan like me it’s even more problematic, since I don’t feel very Arab, very European, very Muslim, very Jewish, very Berber, very Andalouisian, very African, very Maghrebine, and at the same time I feel belonging to all of these groups. So the only Identity which unites all these pieces of me is to say that I feel Mediterranean.

I deal everyday with noble concepts like dialogue of cultures, mutual understanding, or restoring trust. Therefore, even if I am one of the deepest believers in a north-south dialogue, I feel that the Euromed partnership is a chained pigeon as it doesn’t guarantee the freedom of movement for the people from the South of the Mediterranean. The mental barriers can’t collapse as long as the geographical barriers are being enhanced with electrical wires, exaggerated visa procedures, and endless checkpoints. The concept of Union for the Mediterranean itself is very problematic. Let me start by asking the simplest question: Why they didn’t call it Union of the Mediterranean? The simplest answer would be because the Mediterranean is made up of different contradicted blocks: Europe, The Maghreb, The Mashrek, Turkey, and Israel. The word Union assumes egalitarian relationships for a common cause, hence, a perception of a Union based on dichotomies of North/South, developed/undeveloped, Christian/Muslim, or European/Arab is nothing but the continuation of Edward Said’s orientalism in a modern terminology.

The Euromed or the Union for the Mediterranean are geopolitically speaking a form of ‘’imagined geographies’’ to follow the new social and political shifts which acquired after World War II. This methageographical invention is a very positive one for the people of the Mediterranean sea, since it’s their common fate to live together as it was their common past to move once and forth in the Mare Nostrum within the same civilizations. The continual exchange in terms of culture, goods, human beings is a process which no political or ideological circumstances succeeded in stopping throughout the centuries, thus, it’s a clever move to institutionalize this exchange within a framework which could tolerate even the most controversial component of the region: Israel.

From a purely realistic point of view, it is true that the nation state has the right to protect its interests by closing its borders for security reasons. Nevertheless, a humanistic project like constructing a new common civilization based on the Mediterranean shared heritage requires reconsidering the notion of the nation state itself and trying to construct a community based on common values while favoring diversity within elastic political borders. The enterprise of constructing a Euromed identity should pass through the process of imagining the Euromed community. According to Benedict Anderson 1983 “a nation is a community socially constructed, which is to say imagined by the people who perceive themselves as part of that group”, Anderson argues that states are created from different symbols that we attribute to it. Consequently, the members of a community construct a mental image of their affinity even if they are an heterogeneous group in reality. The “imagined community” is gradually constituted by inventing common symbols such as: the flag, the national dish, the national anthem, the official holydays, the national dressing codes… etc Applied to the Mediterranean Anderson’s theory can really be an efficient way to construct a common identity by working on the mental images and highlighting different common symbols that we will not even spend a long time to find since they already exist. For example we can invent a flag for the Mediterranean, declare olive oil and tomatoes as an official dish, and foster academic research on our common anthropological and historical heritage. Anderson’s theory explains how what he calls “print capitalism” helps in consolidate the common mental images, accordingly, focusing our efforts towards producing printed press and publications will support the quick construction of our Mediterranean identity.

After spending hours meditating about the essence of identity I realized that I feel proud of my Moroccan identity with all its diversity, but I decided to put a blue sticker on my passport which reminds of the color of the Mare Nostrum saying: Mediterranean Citizen, because that’s how I feel!

He has no name, because people like him don’t want to have the same identity they were born with any more and decided to burn all their identity papers. He has no family, because he preferred to kill his heart and forget the voices and the faces who gave him birth. He has no fear, because he prefers throwing himself in the cold and pitiless Mediterranean Sea in a small wooden boat with other nameless shadows. Yet, he has a story which I will tell you in this post.

He studied philosophy and spent his college years between experiencing different kinds of love and defending his ideals as the head of the student union in his university. He never imagined that after his bachelor with honors and his orator talent to motivate the crowds he will end up jobless. He fought hard: went on strikes in front of the parliament to get a job, went to that IT classes he never understood, he even convinced his mother to sell her golden bracelets to open a phone shop. None of his efforts was enough to make things go better, even though he never asked for the impossible. All he was dreaming about was a job, a wife, and a small shelter to live happily. After two years of unsuccessful fighting against the harsh reality, the passionate and energetic young man he was became a motionless and depressive zombie who refuses to go out of bed.

On day, while he was busy dreaming after an overdose of weed, he heard noise in the neighborhood of a car and women laughing. He went down to see what’s happening, since he can never give up his Moroccan habit of being curious about neighbors’ lives. He saw Said the neighbors’ son who immigrated to Europe 2 years ago going out of a Mercedes accompanied by his blond European wife in the middle of his family’s yoyos and joy. Said saw him and came to say hi and told him: “if you want to get out from this situation and live like a king you must immigrate to Europe instead of losing your time here”. Then he wrote the name and the number of the person who helped him pass clandestinely to the Spanish shores. To Immigrate! Maybe that was the solution to all his pains, and if Said who has no degree or special skills can succeed why not him.

Here he is in the city of Tangier sitting on the sand and watching the lights of Europe glowing on the horizon. He started asking himself these kinds of philosophical questions he loves so much to escape from the reality. Why I was born on this shore of the Mediterranean and not in the other side? It’s only 18 Km away from here, so why they are developed and we are backsword? Why in the first place the Gods of Olympia asked Heracles to separate Africa from Europe, if Heracles didn’t separate us from this same spot called Tangier we would have been the same land? Off course his questions had no answer, so he just decided to smoke his last cigarette and burn all his identity papers to go meet the man who will pass him to Europe late during the same night.

In the small boat they were 30 pale faces, some Moroccans and many sub-saharian Africans, men, women and even a baby, all sitting tight and watching the passer maneuvering in the wild sea. He was heading towards the unknown, but still confident that if he cross that 18 Km he will find hope. He was imagining himself giving a speech in front of thousands of people staring at him and applauding each single word he says. He saw his marvelous blond wife coming at the end of the speech to congratulate him. At the moment when she was going to kiss him, suddenly, the weather changed. The strong wind slapped him and the first drops of rain swiped his illusion. The boat was becoming not stable, and the people started to panic. In few minutes he realized that they were sinking in the freezing water and that his dreams were sinking to sinking to.

After 45 minutes of fighting against the high waves, there were no crying sounds any more, he looked at Morocco from one side and Spain on the other side, they both looked grey and far with the fog, and he screamed: I don’t belong to none of these places; I prefer dying and immigrating to heaven.

MEKNES, Morocco - On paper, wine is 'haram,' or forbidden to Muslims, but Morocco has become one of the largest winemakers in the Muslim world, with the equivalent of 35 million bottles produced last year. Wine brings the state millions in sales tax, even though Islam appears to be on the rise politically

The gently rolling hills planted thick with vineyards are an unlikely sight for a Muslim country set partly in the deserts and palms of North Africa. Yet the grapes, and the wine they produce, are thriving in Morocco despite Islam's ban on alcohol consumption.

Morocco has become one of the largest winemakers in the Muslim world, with the equivalent of 35 million bottles produced last year. Wine brings the state millions in sales tax, even though Islam appears to be on the rise politically.

"Morocco is a country of tolerance," said Mehdi Bouchaara, the deputy general manager at the Celliers de Meknes, the country's largest winemaker, which bottles over 85 percent of the national output. "It's everybody's personal choice whether to drink or not."

The Celliers have flourished on this tolerance. The firm now cultivates 2,100 hectares of vineyards, bottling everything from entry-level table wine to homemade champagne and high-end claret; its Chateau Roslane claret is aged in a vaulted cellar packed with oak barrels imported from France. The winery now dwarfs virtually any other producer in Europe.

Wine is haram on paper

On paper, wine is "haram," or forbidden to Muslims. But Bouchaara said the firm's distribution is legal since it only sells to traders authorized by the state, who in turn officially sell exclusively to non-Muslim tourists.

Statistics, however, show that Moroccans consume on average 1 liter of wine per person each year, and the Moroccan state itself is the largest owner of the country's 12,000 hectares of vineyards.

The paradox illustrates Morocco's delicate balancing act. The rapidly modernizing country thrives on tourism and trade with Europe, but its people remain deeply conservative. Morocco's ruler, King Mohammed VI, is also "commander of the believers" and protector of the faith. Islamists authorized to take part in politics are the second-largest force in Parliament, while support for non-authorized groups is believed to be even larger.

Despite this uncertain setting for wine culture, the Celliers' owner, Brahim Zniber, is among the country's richest people. His group employs 6,500 people, nearly all of them Muslim, and revenues rose to 225 million euros last year. Its three biggest sources of income are wine production with the Celliers de Meknes, hard liquor imports and Coca-Cola bottling.

Zniber's latest ventures, in addition to a new Moroccan champagne, include plans to build a luxury hotel offering the country's first "vinotherapy" spa resort, with health-care creams and baths based on grape products.

But the group has also tested the limits of the gray zone it operates in. The wine festival it helped promote in 2007 caused protests in nearby Meknes, a deeply religious city of 500,000 run until recently by an Islamist mayor.

"The festival was an unnecessary provocation," said Aboubakr Belkora, the former mayor who was slammed by his own Islamist group, the Justice and Development Party, for halfheartedly authorizing the gathering in the center of town.

The ex-mayor said that "for religious reasons," he uprooted about 100 hectares of vineyards from his own fields but has no qualms with others making or drinking wine.

Others feel there is some hypocrisy to the practice.

Hassan, a restaurant manager, said he wasn't allowed a license to serve alcoholic drinks because he is Muslim. "But everyone knows we serve wine with our food," he said, pointing at the restaurant's patrons, both foreign and Moroccan, sipping their wine over dinner.

Another owner in Meknes, who also requested anonymity because of his practices, said he serves wine in tinted glasses, keeps bottles out of sight, and tells clients to say they were drinking soft drinks if questioned. "Police rarely come, and if they do they never look inside the glass," he said.

These practices reflect a much more lenient culture than in other Muslim countries.

27 million bottles per year

Within Morocco's more favorable context, the Celliers winery sells 27 million bottles per year, mostly inside the country. Two million bottles head to Europe or the United States and the firm is planting another 800 hectares of grapes to meet new demand from China, said Jean-Pierre Dehut, a former liquor-store owner in Belgium hired as the Celliers' export manager.

By the size of the huge new bottling plant it is building and the 450 people it employs, the Celliers is more on-par with the new, industrial-scaled wine businesses in Australia, Chile or California than with Europe's often family-owned domains. But Dehut stressed that Morocco has made wine for at least 2,500 years, since the Phoenicians colonized its coast. "This country exported wine to Rome during the Roman Empire," he said.

Winemaking soared during the French colonial era, which lasted more than 50 years until the country's independence in 1956.

By then, hundreds of vineyards planted with French vines Ğ mostly centered on the sunny plateau around Meknes in northern Morocco Ğ churned out some 300 million hectoliters each year.

Dear Western Friend,

I would really want to initiate an effective dialogue with you and build common projects together far from our mutual stereotypes and fears from each other. If you would like to understand me, you should understand my culture from my point of view, that’s why I’ve decided to write this letter to explain how I’ve been educated and how my society sees certain important issues.

First of all, they teach you since kindergarten how the individual is important for the society and that you should relay on yourself and be independent. So according to your culture if the individual is strong the whole community will be strong. In my culture it’s the opposite, they teach us that “we should help our brother whether he is right or wrong”. We learn to act as a group because for us if the group is strong the interest of the individuals can be protected by the community. For you it’s impolite to eat from other people’s plates and it’s always proper to leave some food in the dish. For us it’s impolite to eat alone, and it’s more proper to eat all in the same big plate and finish the whole food, as we think that sharing food it’s a form of alliance. Your children are more independent and try to build a separated personality from their parents from an early age, whereas, we can’t take any decision without our parents’ permission and the more we resemble to our elders the more proud we are.

You’ve had special sexual education courses and have learned to appreciate the curves of the human body as a piece of art. The only sexual education I’ve got is my biology classes and for my culture the human body is beautiful and precious that’s why we shouldn’t exhibit it as a insignificant piece of meat. We are not as frustrated as some may describe us; Islam even gave sexual advices and celebrated the physical union of women and men. It is just that nowadays educational systems and Medias became more conservative than Islam itself and don’t know how to communicate about sexuality in tribal societies. You defend women’s rights and gender equality as a pillar of democracy. In my culture, we don’t even need to defend women because they have greater roles in the society than men according to Koran. Unfortunately, Koran was designed for an ideal society not the patriarchal ones we all live in today.

You can separate the state from the religion, and most of you can choose to be religious or not without being judged by the society. In schools you can choose having religion courses or not and taking your children to worship places or not. In my culture the state can’t exist without religion. Religion is the constitution and the rule according to which we can choose our leaders. It is more than a dogma; it’s an ethical code and a collective reference for the society. We cannot choose being religious or not because we can’t choose being cultural or not, and for us religion is cultural. Religious places and religious traditions are more than simple rituals; it’s a way of living, an art, a celebration, and a heritage.

The aim of this letter is not to prove who is right or wrong, my purpose is to know you and allow you to know me better, far away from stereotypes and misunderstandings. Because only I can tell you about those grey spots you can’t understand about me, and which we call: Culture. I will be expecting soon a similar letter from you to explain to me the grey spots I can’t understand about you!

“Labas ki dayrin? twahachtkoum bazaf” that would be the Moroccan way to say “how are you? I miss you so much”, and that’s the sentence I would like to say to my friends in the Egypt whenever I meet them, but I know they will not understand me. My friends in the Middles East assume that Morocco is an Arab and Arabic speaking country, what they don’t know is that we’ve been doing so many efforts to understand their dialects for the sake of Arab Nationalism and Unity, and that now that the notion of Umma Al Arabia is old fashion, it’s their turn to do some effort to understand my language: Darija.

Morocco is a special mixture of cultures, languages, and races. We are probably one of the most African Arab countries, not only because of our geography, but also because it was Morocco that introduced Islam to West Africa thanks to its traders, monarchs, and Sufi brotherhoods. Morocco is probably the most Western Arab country as well, since, when other countries were colonized by one European power, my country endured the colonization of France and Spain together with city of Tanger as an international colony where all super powers had representatives there, whereas contrary to all the MENA countries, we’ve never been colonized by the Ottoman Empire. Arab Andalusia was a Moroccan project, and after the fall of Andalucía most if Spanish Arabs, liberal thinkers and Jews came to settle in Morocco. In addition, the Moroccan Kingdom was one of the first countries to recognize the US in the 18th century and to send diplomatic missions all around the western world. Morocco is also Arab, Berber, Roman, Jewish, Mediterranean, Sahraouian etc. My country’s history rich of interaction and openness ended in giving birth to a typical language called Darija.

In reality a variety of different languages are spoken in my country. In the northern Rif people speak Tarifit which is a Berber Saxon dialect formed from the interaction between Saxon Viking settlers and other Berber tribes. In the Atlas people speak Tamazigt, which is the typical dialect of the original inhabitants of the Maghreb, which are supposed to be Gaulois according to the French anthropologists. People in the Souss Valley, southern Morocco speak Tachelhit. Whereas, the Sahraoui people speak Hassaniya, Andalucians in Fes, Rabat or Tetouan speak Andalucían Arabic, and educated people would rather speak French and English. In the midway between all these varieties of dialects and languages, Darija is the language that unites all this diversity in one tongue. It’s the language of interaction between people, of trade, and the one you will hear in the street.

I remember in Journalism School, in Arabic classes that I never wanted to speak classical Arabic. My teacher would get angry and remind me that it’s our language, and I would always answer in Darija “Arabic it’s not my language, I would like to write in the newspaper in Darija and present the news on TV in Darija. Saying our language is Arabic is killing identity with hypocrisy”. Nothing changed since then, Arabic is still the language of the Kingdom according to its constitution, TV, newspapers, Education Manuals, political speeches are still in classical Arabic. If it’s a matter of religion, I really don’t think we’ll be less Muslim if we admit that our language is Darija. Iran, Pakistan, and Indonesia are strong Muslim countries though they don’t speak Arabic! If it’s about our ties with the Middle East, a Moroccan would still look ridiculous trying to speak classical Arabic with a band of Middle Easterns confident about their dialects.

Two Months ago, I was with one of my Egyptian friends in Cairo, and I was answering him in English whenever he was asking a question, until he said “Why you Moroccans want to destroy the Arabic Unity Nasser built. We are one nation and Arabic is the thing that unites us”. I fixed him right in the eyes and said in proper Darija “Sir goul l Nasser dialek désolé 3lawed ana tanhdar bi Darija”, translation “Go tell your Nasser sorry, because I speak Darija”.

On that morning, I was heading to the newspaper with no new stories or article projects in mind when my editor-in-chief called me to ask whether I’ll be interested in interviewing a very special person, and to publish her memories on a daily basis in the newspaper. This very special person was a young student who became a professional prostitute. The editor-in-chief of course was only interested in raising the sales, because the golden rule in journalism is that “When there is no news, you should create the news”. And what’s better than dealing with one of the society’s prime taboos to make the news. I only had one answer to give: I’ll do it!

Morocco has the reputation of having a significant number of young prostitutes. Maybe this stereotype other Middle Eastern countries have about us is a bit exaggerated, but still, Morocco has very well structured prostitution webs, which transform innocent girls to mighty night creatures, and even export them to work outside the country. What most people ignore is that prostitution was a very prosperous activity in pre-Islamic Morocco. Native Berber tribes used to set tents on the roads after the harvest season to offer “entertainment” to peasants after a year of hard work. Prostitution then, was a social service which allowed money circulation among all the tribe’s members. Islam couldn’t change much in the anthropological habits of local people. In my opinion, the high prostitution rates among young Moroccan girls can be explained by the extreme openness to the west and the cultural predisposition to this kind of activities.

For me it was very difficult to write about the subject. Should I feel pity or contempt, compassion or disgust towards this young girl with a university degree who decided to sell her body to make a living? I’ve just decided to play the role of the objective pen, which describes what it hears and sees without the interference of any subjective feelings. Though, it was hard not to make a comparison between me and her. We were both Moroccan girls, born in the same year, listening to the same music, and with university degrees. Yet, each of us chose a different path, or maybe that path chose her.

Her name was Aïcha. She was very blond, very tall, and very beautiful, the kind of the 1960s American films’ beauty. Aïcha had to move after high school from her small town called Lhajeb to study English Literature in Meknes’ college. “My parents didn’t prepare me to live alone in the city. I come from a poor background where talking about sex is a taboo”, she told me while gazing at the horizon. In the girls’ dorms, Aïcha learned how to dress, to put on make-up, and to talk like a woman. It is also in the university dorms that she was tempted to make some pocket money to pay for the pretty clothes which can make her look like city girls. The first step to the abyss was going out incognito with older men who invited her to good restaurants, and make her discover her charms and feminity. The deadly stab was when she discovered that she had to pay with her body for the few bills to realize her late adolescence fantasies.

Once Aïcha graduated, it was difficult to leave her well-paid night life for miserable desk work or to abandon the lights of the big city for a small house in Lhajeb. She told me with a bitter voice “When I was studying it was just to make pocket money. I didn’t realize that I am a prostitute until it became my full-time job after graduating”. Aïcha is still now living in the city and working as a prostitute to send money to her family and pay for her charges. Her education and beauty make very rich and well-known men from over the world pay for her services. After filling four, 120-minute tapes and finishing the interview, the young girl looked straight into my eyes and said “I fast every Ramadan and pray five times a day for Allah to forgive me, but when the night comes I realize that I have to go work for the money.”

Today, whenever I drive across the girls’ dorms of the university, I wonder how many Aïchas are there waiting to be tempted by the big city’s illusive and misleading lights? How many would resist and how many would fall?

25 Moroccan youth and 25 American youth met in the POMED and AID conference, “Find Your Voice: A Cross-Cultural Forum on Political Participation and Civic Activism”, which took place in The Moroccan Capital Rabat last Month. I was asked to share my experience as a young English-speaking blogger with the participants? So I’ve decided to tell them my story through 3 verbs:

To Inform
When to the Moroccan Journalism School for the first time, the first thing I saw was a banner in the entrance wall with sentence “Information is holy, and Comment is Free”. This sentence haunted me for my 4 years in that school, until it became a part of who I am. Unfortunately, in everyday’s journalistic practice all the editors-in-chief I’ve worked with were hammering on me that my opinion doesn’t matter, and only pure information matters. After some years of swallowing my voice, I started believing that “Information is free” but “Comment is not free”. Therefore, I started looking for a way to express my voice.

To Express
In 2004, during one of the first blogging conferences in Morocco by Rachid Jankari, the first Moroccan blogger, I finally discovered the way to express my voice. That night I came home very excited, and created my first blog. It was the kind of blogs where you write your diaries and post poems and abstract photos. In 2006, I started my official blog “Words for change”, because I believe that my only weapon is my words and that by spreading the word it may change the world. Maybe I blog out of narcissism, maybe I blog out frustration, maybe I blog because I would like to share my thoughts, and tell the rest of the world about the place I live in and the problems people of my age face. In all cases, I think that blogging gave me back my voice and completed the other half of that old sentence “Comment is Free”.

We are 30 000 Moroccan bloggers today. Some blog in French, and they are stereotyped as being bourgeois blogging kids who went to French schools. And some blog in Arabic, and they are stereotyped as being Islamist radicals. In between there is some youth who blog in English, including me, who are stereotyped as being American spies. Well, the reality our diversity is a capital that make our strength, even if we aren’t organized as a community yet. Rachid Jankari described the Moroccan Blogosphere as being in its “Adolescence”, which make it unable to compete with classical Medias, and somehow unable to educate.

To Educate
Few months ago, I became a youth ambassador within the Middle East Youth Initiative, which gave me the chance to act as a peer-educator with my blog posts. The MEYI was initiated by the Wolfensohn Centre for Development at Brooking and the Dubai School of Government, as to promote economic and social inclusion of youth in the Middle
East by creating an international alliance of academics, policymakers, youth leaders and leading thinkers from the private sector and civil society. With the MEYI, I realized how it’s difficult to educate, especially that I’m just a 23 years simple girl from the region. My work as a Youth Ambassador is about sharing my little experience as a young journalist, as a youth activist, and as a human being. And that’s the best part of it, because as human beings, my readers may reach a self-identification status, and that’s what may educate.

That’s my story. The story of a blogger who believes that words may bring change, so “spread the word, it may change the world”. That’s how I’ve found my Voice. I hope you’ll find yours!

I always thought that real heroes are those who invented complicated machines or those who came-out with genius theories. All that, was before I met Aicha. Aicha in Arabic means Living. Indeed, in her eyes we can see the flame of life that only true heroes have. In addition to her 8 children and husband, Aicha is living with an unpleasant guest everyday inside her weak body: AIDS.

With her pink traditional dress, which they call Tub in Sudan, Aicha was standing in front of 70 strangers to tell proudly her story with AIDS, during the UNDP HARPAS workshop for Independent Artists, Bloggers, and Journalists, which was held in Cairo from the 5th to the 8th May. “I didn’t commit any crime. I was operated for appendicitis, and they transferred to me blood infected with AIDS. I had to face my family, my children, and the whole society”, she said to her curious audience. In fact in many Arab countries a huge quantity of blood is still used without being well examined. Aicha was lucky enough to have an understanding husband, who supported and encouraged her to tell her story on television and in international meetings without any fear or shame, in such a conservative society full of taboos. Undeniably, “HIV/AIDS’ power is not in the Virus itself, but in the vicious circuit of fear and stigma linked to it”, as Doctor Ihaab Al Kharat from the HARPAS team has explained during the same workshop. In fact, AIDS is just like any other illness that we can live with without any risks if we take the right medicine at the right time.

Nowadays 39.5 million people worldwide are living with the Virus. In the Arab Region they are more than 460 000 people living with AIDS. Yet, I would like to question these figures given by the UNAIDS, because they are all based on government statistics. How can we imagine that a country like Syria only have 300 HIV/AIDS cases, without mentioning the whole Khalij region which doesn’t want to communicate any official figures on the issue? Another alarming figure is that only 5% of the declared AIDS cases in the region have access to treatment. Not because of luck in medicine, but because of the society taboos and of a coward suicidal discourse related to the Virus.

I was so impressed by Aicha that I decided to sit with her and have a long friendly talk. I was like a little child staring at this monument-like lady strong and confident in her 30s. She told me how her husband and she are living a normal sexual life by using condoms during their intercourses. Aicha also gave birth to a little girl, who doesn’t have the Virus, after following the right treatment that reduces the quantity of HIV in the blood during the pregnancy period. However, if science found a way to cope with the situation, the reaction of the doctors, who are supposed to be the most compassionate towards people living with AIDS, was very harsh on her. Once the medical staff learned about her case, they just put her in the quarantine and left her sinking in her blood and tears, shouting until the head of the baby came out.

When I’ve heard that story, I was so angry and disgusted at the same time. I cried fiercely and hugged Aicha. I could not describe that moment. I felt that she is a young woman just like me, and that all the stereotypes of the society disappeared. 48% of people living with AIDS in the Arab World are women, and Aicha is one of the few women who are coping with the Virus in a normal way. I feel I’ve found a hero made out of flesh and blood, who can inspire me in my daily life. For Aicha, and because I believe in life, I will go tomorrow morning to check my blood in one of the local centres, where I can get a free HIV/AIDS test. I hope you’ll do the same!

According the latest investigation on Moroccans and Religious values, initiated by three famous Moroccan researchers: Mohamed El Aydi, Hassan Rachik, and Mohamed Tozy 60% of the Moroccan population never have read Coran before!
I wanted to share with you the outcomes of this research because I’ve found it very interesting, and I was personally choked to notice how incoherent Moroccans can be towards their religion. In fact only 5.6% of Moroccans read Coran everyday, 28.1% read it from time to time, and 58.9% have never read Coran. Well, I can situate my self with the 28%, but I couldn’t believe that even with our strict Islamic educational manuals which impose on us to learn by heart many Sourat and the traditional religious education in the countryside, 60% of the population still have never read their holy book. Probably the statistics are the same in a county like France regarding the bible-readers. Yet, France is a secular country whereas we are an Islamic county if we believe our constitution. Moreover, religious symbols are everywhere: mosques, clothing, education, Imarat Al Muminin…
In the same investigation, 40% of Moroccans think that even if you don’t fast during Ramadan you are still considered as Muslim. 57% disapprove mixed beaches, so maybe I’d better not go swim with a bikini this summer. 83% of the interviewed Moroccans think that women should wear a veil, so I really shouldn’t go swim with a bikini this summer. However, 84% of the population disapproves Takfiir! I feel released, because even if I swim with a bikini and even if most people wouldn’t like it but I would still be seen as a proper Muslim girl!
In addition, more than 99.9% of Moroccan thinks that Islam is the best religion ever and that there is an answer for everything in the Coran, starting from the social organization to the political, economic, and even technological matters. I just wonder why don’t they read Coran so often if there is an answer to everything in its pages? Well, maybe I sould go read Coran right now to find an answer to this issue!

The United Nations University-International Leadership Institute
"Promoting Peace through Dialogue, Middle East Session 2008"
Amman, Jordan | July 20-August 3, 2008

Why Enroll in this Training Seminar?
A 2005 report by the Alliance for Conflict Transformation identified some key recommendations for those pursuing a career in conflict resolution. Gaining practical negotiation and mediation experience and networking were two of the top three recommendations. Current demand exists and will continue to grow for those practiced in negotiation and who have a strong professional network.

Whether you are a student looking to build your resume and gain course credit, or a professional looking to acquire new knowledge and expand your network, "Promoting Peace through Dialogue, Middle East 2008" presents an amazing opportunity. This training seminar includes a two-week residential program conducted by professors, trainers, and speakers from around the world. Participants will receive extensive training in conflict resolution techniques and gain an in-depth understanding of the Israel/Palestine and several other of the world's major conflicts, including the factors which continue to fuel them. Participants will also have the opportunity to increase their knowledge of other cultures through interaction with and exposure to an array of cultural views and backgrounds.

Fees for the seminar include participation in the international conference. If you are interested in registering for the International Conference only, click here.

Participants may also opt to enroll in a study tour to Israel/Palestine.

Who can Enroll?
This program is open to final-year undergraduate students, graduate students, and professionals. Applicants from a variety of backgrounds are encouraged to apply. Only 65 total participants will be accepted for this program.

Note: Academic credits are available. Please visit the Academic Credit page for information.

Seminar Topics
This course is designed to maximize exposure of 65 select participants to the skills and techniques necessary to effectively negotiate and mediate conflict situations. The seminar will be conducted in English. Participants are encouraged to view this course as a career advancement opportunity. To that end, this course will instruct participants in effective networking skills and provides ample opportunities to meet recognized professionals. An exciting aspect of this course is the opportunity to meet and interact with others who are dedicated to the field of conflict resolution and will become international leaders. The topics offered provide an in-depth understanding of multiple aspects of conflict resolution.

Topics will include:

Theory of interest-based negotiation
Interest-based negotiation practice skills
Mediation training
Extensive negotiation and mediation simulations
Project management in conflict zones
Environmental conflict management
Background to the Israel-Palestine conflict
Cultural aspects of conflict resolution
Gender aspects of conflict resolution
Track I and II diplomacy
Developing successful networking skills
Nonviolent strategies to promote negotiation

Course Schedule
The training portion of the program will begin on Sunday morning, July 20, 2008, and will end Sunday, August 3. The final two days of the program, August 2 and 3, will be conducted in conjunction with the an International Conference, allowing students to meet and network with leading professionals.

There will be ample opportunities for participants to explore the city and enjoy its cultural offerings. Accommodations, including breakfasts and lunches are provided from the night of July 19 through the morning of August 4.

Program Faculty
William Monning, J.D., professor of international negotiation and conflict resolution at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, Director of the Mandell-Gisnet Center for Conflict Management at the Monterey College of Law, and co-founder and President of Global Majority, is the academic coordinator of the program and will conduct the core curriculum. Skilled trainers from Global Majority will assist instructors throughout the program.

Guest Speakers and Trainers
A diverse array of internationally recognized academics, professionals, and representatives from various organizations will present on the specific topics outlined above. These experts include:

Dr. Paul Arthur, Course Director of the Graduate Program in Peace and Conflict Studies at the School of History and International Affairs, University of Ulster
Dr. Jairam Reddy, Director, United Nations University-International Leadership Institute
Dr. Tatsushi Arai, Assistant Professor of Conflict Transformation, School of International Training
Jeffrey Mapendere, Executive Director for the Canadian International Institute of Applied Negotiation
Dr. Boatamo Mosupyoe, Director of African Studies Program, Cal-State University, Sacramento
*Due to possible unforeseen events, we reserve the right to revise this list as necessary.

study tour
Leading up to the training seminar, a delegation will visit Israel/Palestine to see the conflict with their own eyes. Participants in this optional study tour will have the opportunity to meet with Palestinian and Israeli nonviolent activists and view the reality of life under military occupation from the perspective of Israelis and Palestinians working for a just resolution to the conflict. The delegation will focus on seeing, listening to, and recording the experiences and perspectives of a range of Palestinian and Israeli voices. This experience will be beneficial to those attending the conflict resolution seminar and conference in Jordan.

The eight day tour will be led by experienced local guides and group facilitators from sponsoring organizations. If you are interested in this optional tour, please indicate so on the application and those organizing the tour will be in contact with program details, costs, and application materials.

For Details see: http://globalmajority.org/gm/index.php?option=com_content&task=category§ionid=16&id=44&Itemid=198

Find Your Voice:
A Cross-Cultural Forum on Political Participation and Civic Activism
Rabat, Morocco
April 25-26, 2008

Americans for Informed Democracy (AID) and the Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED), along with the Institut National de la Jeunesse et la Démocratie (INJD), are now accepting applications for the conference “Find Your Voice: A Cross-Cultural Forum on Political Participation and Civic Activism.”

This two-day conference will be a multilingual dialogue on the necessity of youth mobilization in the political process and empowering emerging leaders in political parties and civil society. Bringing together Moroccan and American experts on media, political party participation, youth mobilization and citizen journalism, participants will engage the speakers in debate, hold small group discussions, and partake in youth mobilization workshops. The participants will also develop and ratify policy recommendations to be presented to government representatives.

Topics will include:

Space for youth in political parties
The role of civil society
Media and democracy
Youth mobilization through citizen journalism
The conference will take place in Rabat, Morocco from April 25-26, 2008. American and Moroccan students and young professionals are encouraged to apply. We seek an ideologically and geographically diverse group of participants. Space is limited, and up to 50 participants will be chosen by a competitive application process.

Lodging and most meals will be provided to participants. Participants are responsible for arranging their own transportation to and from the conference. A limited number of modest travel scholarships are available for highly qualified applicants.

For more information go to www.pomed.org or contact rabatconference@pomed.org.

The Moroccan Minister of Social Welfare Nezha Squalli is taking off her politically-correct face and unveiling her hardcore communist face. In fact Nezha Squalli shamelessly asked for the banishment of the call for prayer of Al Fajr, because she claims that it is disturbing the wellbeing of the foreign tourists during their exotic staying in Morocco.

Well, I would just remind Madame Squalli, that she belongs to a government of an Islamic country and she is “for the moment” the Minister of Amir Al Mu’minin the Prince of the Faithful. Therefore, asking the Minister of Islamic Affairs Ahmed Ataoufik to find a legal way to ban the call of prayer not to disturb tourists is an insult to the high symbols of this nation. Furthermore, the tourists coming to Morocco are supposed to respect the local customs, as Moroccans would do for the Bell rings in Christian countries.

Maybe the Minister, who was a militant of the Moroccan Communist Party, still believes deep-inside that “Religion is the Opium of the People”. Yet, the outrageous thing about this story is that the PPS, the Party of Progress and Socialism is defending their Minister and calling the Press to stop judging Nezha Squalli. For their pat the Islamist movements inside Morocco as well as the more traditionalist streams of the Moroccan Civil Society are calling the Minister to submit her resignation as soon as possible, because she don’t represent the Moroccan population.

From My side I would kindly advice our dear Minister to look to her face in the mirror and ask herself who is she? Since, if a Minister in the government of his Majesty still struggles with her religious identity how can she be an example for the rising generations?

“Morocco is one of the most badly-scored MENA countries as far as education is concerned in terms of access, equity, efficiency, and quality” according to the World Bank’s recent MENA Development Report. The newly published report was a real earthquake for the whole country and especially for every person who is a pure fruit of this educational system, including me. I’m neither a formal institution nor a specialist on the issue, yet my 19 years spent in Moroccan schools enabled me to do an autopsy of the Moroccan educational system by asking the five classical WH questions.

What? The Moroccan Educational System is not one system but a mixture of many models. For centuries, only privileged elite could get educated. This traditional first form of education was mostly religious and the holders of this Power/Knowledge were considered a very influential class in the society and called Al Fukaha -- the knowledgeable. When the French colonizing machine came to Morocco, it brought with it a whole new model of teaching based on an orientalist dichotomy. Both traditionalist and imperialist systems have one thing in common: they show you what is good and what is evil, but never dare to tell you how to make the evil become good.

Who? Many actors shaped the face of the Moroccan educational system. Hassan II is incontestably one of the characters who has left the biggest impact on the schooling system. Under the pressure of the right wing Istiqlal party, Hassan II led a huge Arabization movement in a society which speaks Darija, Amazigh, and French but not Classical Arabic, which resulted in the rise of frustrated militant minority groups from one hand and hardcore fundamentalists from the other. And during the 1970s, all the philosophy colleges were closed down -- except the Rabat Philosophy College -- as to counter the communist rise in the country. Therefore, additional actors were all the teachers who lacked both in resources and pedagogy to educate their pupils. In the middle of this turmoil, the actors forgot to teach the future generations how to critically think.

Where? Centralization is one of the characteristics of this weak Moroccan educational system. It is true that primary education became a priority during the last few years. However, secondary and higher education is still concentrated in the major cities when the majority of the population live in the rural areas. This issue along with the tribal patriarchal mentality pushes many conservative families to deprive their daughters from schooling. So far, no one is thinking how to find practical solutions to solve these problems.

When? Four years ago an ambitious educational reform started in Morocco when the Ministry of National Education and the Royal Committee on Education published a Charter on Education and Training. Since then, access and equity became the strategic priority. Illiteracy campaigns were led among the elders and the Amazigh language finally gained academic recognition. The research and national will is there, yet , nobody knows how to translate it to reality.

Why? Many reasons can be given for the unfortunate state of Moroccan education. The first may be the failure of the French-like bipolar system based on weak public universities (14 universities) in addition to an important number of specialized and selective institutions (139 schools). Another reason is the political manipulation of the educational system for many decades to keep the public opinion under control. Thousands of zealous explanations can be proclaimed, but if you want the opinion of someone who lived the experience from the inside let me share with you only one example, and you’ll understand why this educational system is so ineffective: In my Family Education class, instead of learning how to take care of a child, how to sew, and how to cook, I’ve had to learn the manual by heart and recite it in front of my teacher!

How? Sorry, I can’t answer this question, because in the system where I was educated they only taught me what the problem is, and not how to solve it.

When I was packing my bags to go to the Catalonia, Spain to the Euro- Med training on Gender and Religion, I was wondering if it’s not just some other futile training full of theory and which never come up with any practical projects or achievements. Well I was wrong!

During the training course Jews, Christians, Muslims, and non-believers had to live, travel, work and party together for 10 days in the Comarruga Youth Hostel. We all came with our education, our religious backgrounds, our stereotypes, and methods of work. Yet, the 23 participants from all over the Meditareenian Sea were all ready to learn and to tolerate people from other confessional roots.

The fourth day we went in a field trip to Tarragona to visit the various religious communities there. Guess what, there was no Jewish community in this old Roman marvellous city because of the 15th century hatred, whereas the strong Muslim community is still struggling to build a mosque for its believers. Spain is a secular country according to its constitution. Yet, the state still supports the Church by giving 8% of the taxes’ incomes to the Catholic Christian Church. In addition, Spain still seems much occupied by its bloody past full of Judaic & Islamic phobia of the early Catholic Kings of Spain.

Michael, Paulo and I weren’t affected by this Spanish mood. A Jew, a Christian and a Muslim succeeded in becoming friends very easily during this training course. Micha is a Russian Jew who left his family in Moscow at the age of 16 to go to Israel living in a Kibbutz and serving 3 years in the Israeli Army. He is now a traditional and modern Judaic jewellery designer in Jerusalem waiting for the Devine call to become a committed Religious Jew. Paulo was born in Roma in Italy, with a balcony on the Vatican and the sounds of thousands of bells ringing all over the place. Paulo even shacked-hands with the formal Pope John Paul II when he was a child, but since he is a social sciences graduates Erasmus student, he just decided to question his given dogma and travel around the world looking for Secular answers instead of Religious ones. As regards me, I was born in a conservative Moroccan Muslim family. I discovered other religions very early, and have chosen to remain a very spiritual Muslim out of conviction. My studies of journalism, diplomacy and communication thought me how to be very politically correct with people different than me without really caring about them.

In this training we were just three human beings willing to learn and go forward. Micha was sharing with us his stories in the army when he caught a 9 years old Palestinian kamikaze. Paulo was telling us that he sees the bible as a literature book and questions the nature of the Christ. When, I was telling them how important for me to stay Virgin until marriage because of my belonging to the Prophet Mohammed’s genealogical tree. We were so different in education, faith and hopes, yet, we all enjoyed heavy metal songs, the smell of tobacco or extra olive oil on our meals.

In one of the simulations of the course, each of us has to play a role other than his real life’s role. I had to be the representative of a very conservative party. I’ve had to stand against the building of a Muslim mosque in Spain. After the simulation was over; I felt very bad because for few hours I had to be the persecutor of my own community especially that many Moroccan immigrants in Europe suffer from the same right wing discourse everyday. I discovered how hatred is easy and how tolerance and acceptance is hard to reach as far as religious issues are concerned.

By Tomorrow I’ll be back in my country, where I am surrounded of Muslims everywhere and where the Media and the different ideological discourses are the only resource to discover people from other religions. Nevertheless, this time I’ll be taking with me in my bags the souvenir of three friends from different backgrounds who learned to tolerate each other, to accept each other as we are, to coexist for 10 days in peace, and above all to care about one another. This caring is the main achievement one can get as a human being.

* This article is a MEYI property (http://www.shababinclusion.org)

Everybody knows the story of the three Japanese Wise Monkeys (see no evil, hear no evil, speak no evil). Well let me tell you the story of a young journalist, who feels like that monkeys. Yet, this Monkey seeks no wisdom. She just feels that her senses are being paralyzed by too much frustration in a Middle Eastern country called Morocco.

I CAN’T SEE. In my country we have only two TV channel, and both are controlled by the state. There are people I don’t like to see, like the characters they show on TV who look like living on another planet. There are people I would like to see, like the political leaders or my municipality civil servants. Unfortunately, these people sit on desks situated in very high towers which my sight can’t reach. And there are things I’m forced to see, like the thousands of doctorate holders protesting in front of the parliament, the poor youth being brain-washed trying to bomb them selves, or many others who venture on the Mediterranean Sea risking their lives to make a living.

I CAN’T HEAR. I’ve grown up in the middle of the Economic crisis of the 1980s and 1990s. We had no music of our own then. We used to listen to music made by other people to other people. I live in a place where we hear rumours all the time, because we are somehow afraid of the truth. Sometimes I hear machines and constructions around. However, even deaf; I can still understand that these houses and infrastructures are not for me, but for wealthy people who can pay for it.

I CAN’T SPEAK. My tongue is chained by three chains called: Religion, Patria, Monarchy. I can shout on strikes, on football games, or on public markets, but what can I have to say if I can’t speak about the main components of my identity, as noted in our constitution: Islam, Morocco, and the King.

The Moroccan Monkey is handicapped in his senses. Still, he has a heart full of hope, honour and ambition. With his heart he can see him self in the mirror of reality, hear the hymn of change and shout loud for glory!

Qu'est ce que le Marketing?
- T'es dans une soirée, tu vois une nana qui te plaît ; tu t'approches et tu lui
dis « J'suis super bon au lit ». Ça c'est du marketing direct.
- T'es dans une soirée, t'es avec un groupe d'amis, tu vois une nana qui te plaît,
une de tes amies s'approche d'elle et lui dit « Tu vois ce mec, il est super
bon au lit ». Ça c'est de la pub.
- T'es dans une soirée, tu vois une nana qui te plaît, tu t'approches, lui
demandes son numéro de téléphone, le lendemain tu l'appelles, et tu lui dis «
J'suis super bon au lit ». Ça c'est du télémarketing.
- T'es dans une soirée, tu vois une nana que tu connais, tu t'approches, tu lui
rafraîchis la mémoire, et tu lui dis « Tu te souviens comment j'suis super bon
au lit ». Ça c'est du Customer Relashionship Management.
- T'es dans une soirée, tu vois une nana qui te plaît, tu te lèves, tu t'arranges
un peu les fringues, tu t'approches, tu lui sers un verre. Tu lui dis qu'elle sent bon,
qu'elle est bien sapée, tu lui offres une clope et tu lui dis « J'suis super
bon au lit ». Ça c'est du Public Relation.
- T'es dans une soirée, tu vois une nana qui te plaît, tu t'approches et tu lui
dis « J'suis super bon au lit » et en plus tu lui montres les muscles, ça
c'est du merchandising.
- T'es dans une soirée, une nana s'approche et te dit « J'ai entendu dire que t'es
super bon au lit ». Ça c'est du Branding « Le pouvoir de la Marque ».
- T'es dans une soirée, tu vois une nana qui te plaît, tu t'approches et tu lui
dis « J'suis une bête sexuelle, j'suis super bon au lit, et en plus je tiens
toute la nuit ». Ça c'est de la publicité mensongère, et c'est puni par la loi.
- T'es dans une soirée, tu vois une nana qui te plaît, tu la mates avec des
potes, tu fais des réflexions très fines, tu te bourres la gueule, tu ne fais
rien du tout et tu rentres bredouille. Ça c'est la réalité du marché

Comment expliquer l'économie ? Réponse: Ce n'est pas compliqué grâce à la théorie des vaches....

SOCIALISME : Vous avez 2 vaches et vous en donnez une à votre voisin.
COMMUNISME : Vous avez 2 vaches, le gouvernement vous les prend et vous donne un peu de lait.
FASCISME : Vous avez 2 vaches, le gouvernement vous les prend et vous vend un peu de lait.
NAZISME : Vous avez 2 vaches. Le gouvernement vous les prend et vous tue.
BUREAUCRATIE : Vous avez 2 vaches. Le gouvernement vous les prend, en tue une, trait l'autre et jette le lait.
CAPITALISME : Vous avez 2 vaches. Vous en vendez une et achetez un taureau. Vous les laissez se reproduire et quand l'économie monte, vous vendez tout et retirez le bénéfice.
ENTREPRISE AMERICAINE : Vous avez 2 vaches. Vous en vendez une et forcez l'autre à produire autant de lait que 4 vaches. Plus tard, vous embauchez un consultant pour analyser pourquoi la vache est morte.
ENTREPRISE FRANCAISE : Vous avez 2 vaches. Vous faites grève car vous en
voulez 3.
ENTREPRISE JAPONAISE : Vous avez 2 vaches. Vous les reconcevez pour qu'elles fassent 1/10 de la taille d'une vache normale et qu'elles produisent 20 fois plus de lait. Vous créez ensuite un dessin animé appelé VacheKemon et le commercialisez dans le monde entier.
ENTREPRISE ALLEMANDE : Vous avez 2 vaches. Vous les reconcevez pour qu'elles vivent 100 ans, mangent une fois par mois et se traient elles même.
ENTREPRISE ITALIENNE : Vous avez 2 vaches mais vous ne savez pas où elles sont, et allez déjeuner.
ENTREPRISE RUSSE : Vous avez 2 vaches, vous les comptez et en trouvez 5. Vous recomptez en en trouvez 42. Vous recomptez encore une fois et en trouvez 2. Vous arrêtez de compter et ouvrez une autre bouteille de vodka.
ENTREPRISE SUISSE : Vous avez 5000 vaches et aucune ne vous appartient. Vous facturez les propriétaires pour garder leurs vaches.
ENTREPRISE CHINOISE : Vous avez 2 vaches, vous avez 300 millions de gens pour les traire. Vous clamez qu'il y a le plein
emploi, une grande productivité bovine et arrêtez le journaliste qui a donné les chiffres. ENTREPRISE INDIENNE : Vous avez 2 vaches, vous les adorez.
ENTREPRISE ANGLAISE : Vous avez 2 vaches, elles sont toutes les 2 folles.
ENTREPRISE MAROCAINE: Vous avez 2 vaches, et vous ne savez pas quoi en faire et vous importez du lait...!

The Warm Mediterranean weather turned cold inside the varnished stones of the Moroccan Journalism Institute’s German style building. About 90 pale faces were sitting in the hall waiting for their turn to take the interview for studying in this prestigious college. They all know that if they succeeded out of 1500 students in the written exam, only 30 lucky people will remain by the end of the day.

Want to read the whole article?
Go to: http://www.shababinclusion.org

The Moroccan people are a bit different than the rest of the Middle East in terms of International relations. For example, International news has a very small place in our Press and TV. People don't really care about what is happening. They are becoming more like Western people who are busy making a living. Yet, Moroccans still react sometimes when there is a psychological geography feeling with some countries like Palestine or Iraq. However, the 24 hours channels hammered a lot these subjects to the point that everyone sees these conflicts now as daily routine. Even in universities, we still don’t have strong International Relations’ departments or analysts, like the Egyptians or the Palestinians. In this mix, Moroccan young public opinion is still very reactive instead of well informed.

Even if the US Elections are very crucial for Morocco, Young Moroccans don't seem really to distinguish between Democrats and Republicans or Donkeys and Elephants, apart from some rare elite or International Studies’ students. Morocco needs the US support not only in its big battle for the Sahara issue but in all development and military affairs now on. Therefore, the modern Moroccan kingdom is still more concerned about what's going on in France more than what's going on in the US. I have even experienced a fever of enthusiasm among the supporters of Sarkozy and Royal during the French 2007 elections. I may suggest that the Transformational Diplomacy of Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice hasn't been well implemented in Morocco. One can just visit the US Embassy’s web site http://www.usembassy.ma/ to notice that nothing have been done to inform the average Moroccan about the US elections! The truth is, the revolutionary diplomacy of Rice about going to the normal people and explaining to them what is happening, and making diplomats like field people, is nothing but wonderful dreams.

I really think, it would be good if I can make a small opinion poll among Moroccan youth on the US elections battle. From what I know and have been discussing with my friends, Moroccans favour the Clinton family. Hilary Clinton has good ties with Morocco. She even created in my University a Centre for Women Empowerment which operates in the Atlas region http://www.aui.ma/VPAA/hrcwec/index.htm. Hilary Clinton also received an honorific Master degree for her work. Moreover, Bill Clinton has a reputation of a man of peace in the Moroccan mind after what he did in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The ex-president visited Morocco and was the architect of the free trade agreement between the two countries, whereas, President Bush just sent a letter of apology to the Moroccan king for not being able to come to Morocco in his Middle East tour.

Yet, the US has impregnated for the last years an image of a "Macho" & a “Racist” state. Therefore, I often hear my peers saying that "even if Americans look very democratic, but they are still a patriarchal conservative state, which won't allow a woman to rule them". Furthermore, young Moroccans also may tend to think that Americans won't accept an afro-American president like Obama, even with Operah's support.

From another perspective, young Moroccans are big consumers of the American film industry. Thus, American serials like "24 Hours” or "Commander in Chief” have contributed to make the idea of having a female or an afro-American president of the World’s greatest power more acceptable for the world's mass.

Waiting for the Transformational Diplomacy’s revolution http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2006/59306.htm to gain more concern about the American political matters, the young Moroccan is still in general lost between the Elephant and the Donkey. But to be fairer with the Moroccan public opinion, let’s wait and see how the mass will react on the elections’ eve once they have more information.

300 is the name of one of the best films that was launched this year in Hollywood. For me, when 300 is mentioned, it reminds me of the union of 300 outstanding Arab youth in Al Ein Asoukhna in Egypt between the 19th and the 23ed November 2007 in the League of the Arab States First Youth Forum.

The Hollywoodian film 300 and the LAS Youth Forum’s 300 active youth have a lot in common, especially the spirit of battle. In the LAS Youth Forum’s case it was a great battle to harmonize between different and diverse young people, and to build a common discourse and a common vision about the future.

The League of Arab States in the person of Mr. Khalid Ouhichi and his exceptional team succeeded in collecting funds from a number of organizations to make the dream of uniting the Arab Youth comes true. Yet, these same sponsors were a hard burden on the Forum’s programme, as they imposed many incoherent sections and some boring speakers that the organizing team couldn’t avoid.

The Arab League was very ambitious, and its ambitions seem to give its fruits. The first step was to hire a hardcore Youth Activist like Mr. Haythem Kamel to coordinate the event, which gave the Forum a spark of originality and Young spirit. Indeed, for the first time the participation was through online applications instead of hosting participants that the local governments choose. The second thing to applaud is the way the Forum was run: A modern open-minded and open to criticism management of the event. I guess the Arab League has learned a lot from its partnership with the Council of Europe in terms of Youth integration. The LAS section of Mr. Ouahichi even insisted in creating a consultative Youth Committee to participate in the preparation of the event. I had the chance to be a part of this team, and I can say with all the objectivity of a researcher, that we were integrated in every single detail of the Forum preparation. Our suggestions were highly taken into consideration, to a point that sometimes all the work was changed to please us, as we were a sample of the coming 300.

Some claim that 300 Arab Youth are hard to control in a beautiful hotel on the Red Sea. I would say that the main objective of a first Forum was Networking, and networking can be realized either in workshops or plenary or even in a football game on the beach. I was even impressed by groups of youth with common interests holding meeting till midnight in a very professional way to debate about their projects.

We always hear the stereotype of “the Arabs agree not to agree”. After living the experience of this forum, I could say with confidence that the age of this proverb is gone. I have seen maturity, creativity as well as methodological working in these 300 soldiers of the Arab future.

Focusing on the weaknesses of the Forum would be a lost of time, especially that the strengths are much more numerous and important. I needed some time and space to judge the forum and write my report, and I can see many outcomes of this 4 days event.

First of all the Forum was very flexible. Workshops that needed more time were organizing follow-up meetings after the end of the work days. The organizers were very open to criticism and even tried during the last day to modify the mistakes of the previous days by giving the microphone and the plenary presidency to the Youth. In addition, all the evaluation forms are taken very seriously and being examined by the LAS team.

Furthermore, the Forum ended –thanks God- without the classical Arab recommendations that we all know very well and hate very much. This event wanted to finish with concrete measurable projects that the LAS and its partners can follow up and support. Regarding the projects them selves, they translate the real needs of the Arab Youth: creation of Quality Commission for youth projects, creation of an Arab Youth Parliament, creation of an Arab Youth Network for training trainers on Democracy issues, creating an NGO for Arab Young Bloggers, Holding a Forum exclusively for Arab Young Artists… If we analyze these projects, we can conclude that our Youth are claiming structures with a stable board and funding to meet and work. Our 300 realized that in this post-modern world there is no place for amateurism and meetings where we simply wine and dine and go home happy. It is time to build structures and umbrella organisations where these capacities can be exploited, and were the Arab Youth work can be fulfilled in a professional methodological way.

At the end, I can’t predict what these projects would become tomorrow. Therefore, what I know for sure is that all the Youth are still motivated and in touch with each other, and new projects and ideas are circulating on the internet everyday like: the Arab Erasmus, the Dahab meeting, the Oriflame Network elaboration. Hence, the end of the 300 Arab Youth is fortunately not similar to the 300 film end, because if the 300 heroes die at the end of the Zack Snyder’s film, our 300 Soldiers of change are still alive holding the torch of change. No one can stop the 300!

Lewis and Wigen unveiled a very dangerous part of what we considered as “science”, as they revealed that continents are nothing but geopolitically constructed discourses that change their shapes with socio-political implications. Area studies in the U.S were founded to provide a good knowledge about unknown parts of the earth for the new hegemonic power.

Earth labeling is an old game that Europeans have been playing to explain their imperialist maneuvers. Whether based on civilizational divisions, world system logic or world regions’ classification, the game of labeling is still a stereotyped euro-centered academic discourse, designed to back up geopolitical aims.

In this paper I would try first to explain the logic of Metageography that Lewis and Wegen suggest. Then I would try to follow the progression of Area Studies in the U.S in time explaining what could be its future role. Moreover, I will try to expose the metageographical units of division of the earth, with a focus on the World Regions’ alternative scheme and explain each unit’s weaknesses.

In “The Myth of Continents: A critique of Metageography” the historian Martin Lewis and the geographer Karen Wigen argue that continents are irrelevant. The two writers arguments provides a good understanding of how Area Studies served Geopolitics by labeling the Earth and constructing reductionist discourses, as to satisfy the Great Powers’ pragmatic needs. Zoogeography and Geology prove that Geographer’s division of continents is irrelevant if we analyze the Faunal, the Floral, and the Tectonic truths.

In this process of labeling the Earth in a Euro-centric way, Europe stands as a big anomaly in the continents’ scheme from a physical geographical perspective. “Europe is by no stretch of the imagination a discernible landmass; it can’t be reckoned a continent according to the dictionary definition of that term” (M. Lewis & K. Wigen, 1997). Europe is an extension of Asian, yet, most geographers still consider it as “an archetypal” continent because of human geography characteristics that distinguish it from Asia. This just tells how much geography is a constructed discourse to serve hegemonic supremacy as well as to justify in“scientific” way imperialism. In a peace on Environmentalism and Eurocentrism James M. Blaut says that “the crystallization of northern European’s tiny feudal polities into modern states occurred for reasons that had little to do with topographic differentiation…” (J. M. Blaut, 1999). Geographers like Henry Thomas Buckle or Paul Vidal de la Blache, claim supremacy for their local civilization within Europe, but no one seemed to contest Europe’s supremacy. Environmental determinism and Social Darwinism played a huge role in Imperialist discourse about “The White Man’s Burden” or the French “Mission Civilisatrice”. Russia in Lewis & Wigen arguments is the geographical and cultural face of the European anomaly, since it's both Asian and European. History has proven that even Russian used its two faces following geopolitical strategies, moving from the 19th century typically European Russian to a more Asian- turned Cold War country.

If we admit that cultural distinction can provide basis for continental division, how can we call Asian one continent, when the Indian Subcontinent, the Gulf region, South East Asia, and other parts of it are completely different entities? Does it mean that the cultural logic that applies to Europe doesn’t apply to others? Andrew March suggests that the answer to these questions “say more about European scholars’ psychology than about Asian geography”.

Mental maps in popular imagination are very revealing of how much areas’ labeling can blur realities. In Area Studies for example, Asian studies don’t include Iran or Siberia or Lebanon. The same logic is applied in the press and official discourse. “The boundaries of the continents have become loose from their geographical moorings; these categories have become increasingly vague in the public imagination, reducing their usefulness even as locating devices” (M. Lewis & K. Wigen, 1997). What is alarming are the endless geopolitical designations that the public adopt without any criticism, like: the Middle East, The South, the third World… Lenus Hoskins in Euro-centrism vs. Afro-centrism, questions our way of looking at realities, and suggests looking from the eyes of Mother Africa for example instead of the eyes of Father Europe (L. A. Hoskins, 1992). Contemporary geographers aren’t much different from their racist Euro-centric predecessors, since they all still play the game of labeling the Earth. Even Lewis & Wigen alternative scheme is nothing but a modified version of Metageography.

Area Studies:

Area Studies are one of the key studies to understand Metageography and how geopolitical discourse was constructed, that’s why I suggest examining the emergence of area studies and the challenges it faces today. Hence, I have analyzed scholarly papers which were produced in different periods since the rise of Area Studies in the 1940s to nowadays.
American government and universities understood after World War II the necessity of understanding the unknown areas. Since, in Foucault’s terms “Power is Knowledge”, and the U.S was about to become the most powerful country, it opened government financed Area Studies divisions in prestigious universities. “American Military personnel had never before attempted to coordinate a worldwide effort, and the ensuing search for international expertise, both for planning military strategy and for orchestrating the post-war settlement” (M. Lewis & K. Wigen, 1997). Consequently, the American Council for Leaned Societies, the National Research Council, the Social Sciences Research Council, and the Smithsonian Institute merged together during the 1940s to create the Ethnographic Board, which was meant to operate in Area Studies.

Werner J. Cahnman, a member of the Association of American Geographers and a live witness of the creation of area Studies in the early 1940s, wrote in 1948 that “the new trend responds to a new need. Areas Studies is another way of saying that the United States of America has become mindful of the international expansion of its interests” (W. J. Cahnman, 1948), Cahnman’s statements shows the pragmatic perspective behind the creation of these studies. Yet, the main fears of that phase were that “Area Studies are being viewed as the chambermaid of Politics”, and the influence of Ratzelian “life-space” and Darwinism on the divisions of Area Studies in the U.S.

Marshall K. Powers in 1955 points out that Area Studies, as an attempt of understanding of the other, can prevent another World War. During the 1950s, Area Studies wasn’t yet a well established scholarly discipline, so it needed to undergo “the challenge of acquiring respectability” (M. K. Powers, 1955). Afterwards, Arian Studies became very popular and the trend of the 1980s in these studies was focused on Area Studies Economics (Philip A. Kuhn, 1984). This trend can be historically explained by the Capitalism vs. Socialism dichotomy of the Cold War.

Area Studies nowadays, are facing a real crisis as the cold war is over. It struggles to reinvent it self in a “scientific” or post-modernist shape. Yet, “Globalization as the dominant concept of the 1990s suggests powerful processes of homogenization and convergence that make increasingly irrelevant the detailed knowledge of internal affairs of different countries and regions” (Peter J. Katzenstein, 2001). One can argue that Katzentein’s fears are premature, as 9/11 revealed that Area Studies are still relevant but in cultural and religious terms. I also think that the challenge that Area Studies face today is deeply philosophical, since it needs to go from epistemology to ontology, from the (How?) to the (Why?), as to understand cultural phenomena far from the Core.

Units of Metageographical Divisions:

According to Lewis & Wigen there are three major ways of Metageographical divisions which have been used to divide and classify the Earth: Civilizations, Systems and regions. The historian and the geographer suggest as a solution for the blur divisions a new division by there own, based on World Regions as unit of analysis.

The first Unit of division is Civilization. The British historian Arnold Toynbee, in the beginning of the century, “took civilizations as his operative categories, describing these geo-historical formations as quasi-isolated and essentially comparable units of analysis.” (M. Lewis & K. Wigen, 1997). According to Toynbee, all civilizations undergo Ibn Khaldoun’s phases of “birth, growth, decline, and fossilization”. Toynbee wanted to challenge the Hegelian Euro-centric “Unity of History”, but meanwhile, he drew a rigid line between what he calls “civilized” and “uncivilized” societies and ignored cultural interchange and religious minorities across civilizations. For this historian, written texts of religious value determine civilizations, because civilizations rise with the rise of a new world religion. Therefore, regions with oral traditions were considered uncivilized by Toynbee. This elitist division of the world to historical and a-historical influenced the early Area Studies’ classification. The end of the Cold War broke the bio-polar system and gave birth to two theories; Fukuyama’s End of History unipolar theory and the Huntington’s civilization-based system. Samuel Huntington, a public intellectual that is both a Harvard scholar and a statecraft-man, stood as the heir of Arnold Toynbee by claiming in 1993 that “the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural… the principal conflict of global politics will occur between civilizations” (Samuel Huntington, 1993).

Huntington was both right and wrong. He predicted in a way the great doctrinal disputes. At the same time he missed the fact that transnational terrorist actors with religious extremist believes can’t be spotted clearly in a map. Moreover, the recent conflict is not between two civilizations, but between states that have certain “modern” values and non-state actors that produces an anti-modernist discourse. How can Huntington’s theory fit in a world where Islamist movements carry out terrorist acts in other Muslim countries?

The second unit of metageographical division is Systems. William Mc Neill pointed the rise of a world system beyond civilizations, whereas, Braudel “focused on systemic interactions that transgressed both state and civilizational boundaries” (M. Lewis & K. Wigen, 1997). According to Immanuel Wallerstein, civilizations aren’t isolated, and what civilizationaists label as marginal areas have played an important role in history of the core. These peripheries provided row material and cheap labor for the core in a neo-Marxist perspective. Hence, world system theory is economic-centered and gives little sense to cultural considerations as Weight would say. Another danger of this division is the mapping of “cultural centrality” over “economic centrality”. It is wiser to consider the world from a postmodern perspective, which says that identities aren’t rigid and new identities continue to be created everyday. Even Karen Wigen argues that; culture, power, and place interact endlessly to create new schemes both culturally and economically, as it is the case in Asia (K. Wigen, 1999).

Alternative Scheme:

Lewis and Wigen suggest remedying to the incoherence of previous divisions, by introducing an alternative scheme based on Regions, which they define as “large socio-spatial groupings delimitated largely on the grounds of shared history and culture” (M. Lewis & K. Wigen, 1997). The two authors explain this new unit of division saying; “where the continental scheme is based on a spurious identity between human grouping and landmasses they inhabit, the world regional framework attempts to delimitate areas of shared ideas, related life ways, and long-standing cultural ties” (M. Lewis & K. Wigen, 1997).

The cartography of the 17th and 18th century established sub-continental divisions based on size, political feature or languages, which served for the American Area Studies divisions. Even if these classifications changed once and forth and may appear inconsistent. Yet, they offer certain “fluidity” compared with the continental division. “Meanwhile, the world regional grid gradually acquired a life of its own outside of American institution” (M. Lewis & K. Wigen, 1997), as people in these regions entered in a self-identification process, adopting these classifications as their identities. According to Robert stock “the most important of Lewis and Wegen’s proposals include the treatement of central asia as a distinct region and the separation of an African American region” (R. Stock, 1999). Still, this Regional model of division is very geographically deterministic. We could even say that Lewis and Wegen tried to avoid Metageography and fail in Metageography again.

Going from the civilizational scheme of labeling the earth to World systems theory’s economic and European-centered division and ending in Lewis and Wegen’s World regions alternative divisions, all are nothing but stigmatized temptations to label the earth on the metageographical level for geopolitical reasons. Nowadays geographers explore new categories like Oceans and hydrographic based divisions of world region, as a new trend that Duke University is exploring (M. Lewis & K. Wigen, 1999).

Area studies as a major machine of geopolitics operated since W.W.II closely with politics to draw a biased map of the world. These Studies are still very relevant today after 9 – 11 but in a cultural and religious sense, as to go from explaining societies to understanding them.

Reference List:

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I don’t know how much of you have tried the London Eye. When you are going up, it’s kind of slow, but once you’ve reached the zenith and coming down, it’s pretty faster than what you can realize. Well, I guess in the wheel of history we are trapped in that speedy side of the wheel. Our notion of time and space has changed since we’ve reached the zenith of our history: 9/11. Have any of you had enough time to figure out what is happening since then: The War on Afghanistan, Palestinian Intifada, The War on Iraq, Iran nuclear game, The Tsunami, Katrina, The Cedar Revolution… Even analysts and political scientists can not pursue the events with the necessary depth, as they are them selves being taken by the flow of never-ending new events. Where are we in History? That’s a question I want to ask.

I believe Time is elastic. However, some states keep fighting over space and drawing imaginary lines and “national boundaries”. Hey dear states of the earth wake up! Fighting over land is a post-colonial matter, not to say a medieval issue. Some other states fight over identity: Kurds, Amazigh, Aboriginals, Gays, and Women… All want rights and space where to practice these rights. Hey dear communities of the earth wake up! Fighting over recognition is a twentieth century thing. I see no groups seriously fighting over time! Does the US have power over time? NO. So it’s not the twenty-first century first power in any way.

As a graduate student in International Relations, I find nowhere a theory dealing with strategic time management in International Relations, or at least, a Time-Space theory other than the old-fashion geopolitics of Uncle Kissinger.

As a passenger of that speedy wheel, I seriously consider what would be waiting for me once down when the tour would be finished. Are we heading towards the Holy Scriptures’ apocalypse or Kaplan’s disaster or something else? Anyway, it seems to be the end of an era, or an eon as would say some, in the universe.

I’m not a prophet, and not even a proper researcher. I’m just like birds sensing the upheaval when it’s near. Then, I would just like to ask real specialists to stop analyzing the means (oil, nuclear power, military, water…), or the events or even the personalities of the leaders, because “there is no logic to human behavior” as thought me Dr. Kalpakian. Maybe it’s more efficient to start looking at the wider picture, while drawing on physics for instance, and studying Meta-Time. Our real future enemy can’t be defeated with soft or hard power it’s beyond that. It’s up to you to figure out how to beat it. It’s Time.

Since the middle of the nineteenth century, new-comers from North Africa brought with them to France their diverse cultural heritage. These local forms of cultural expression were used for the entertainment of foreign workers. During colonization, North African militants used many forms of arts and expression to resist and condemn the French rule in their countries.

The original forms of cultural expression focused on values of the motherland, Nationalism as well as working-class suffering, which is hard for the second generation to identify themselves with, as they were born and raised in France and were facing different realities and problems during the 1970s and 1980s. The clash between the first generation and second generation values and perception of the space gave birth to a new form of cultural expression during this period. “Caught between the “Myth of Repatriation” and the growing intolerance toward North Africans, some immigrants children turned to collective forms of cultural expression to address intergenerational tensions and to assert their right to inclusion in French society” (Derderian 2004).

The immigrants developed a new Genre of arts in theater, literature, Medias, music and cinema of course. Cinema, as a way of expression which can convey scenes of every day’s life with sound and picture, is one of the most important and efficient way to communicate about immigration issues. Since the 1970s on, a generation of French filmmakers, from different backgrounds from North African origins, appeared in the French cultural scene to tell the stories of their communities, to seek social integration or simply to achieve an esthetic work.

In this paper we will examine the rise and development of French filmmakers from North African origins, and try to understand the aim behind this fever to share emotions through sound and picture. We will also study their cinematographic production with regards to their being at the center of interculturality between the “departure country”s vision and the “host country”s vision of the universe. Yet, cinema is not only a form of artistic manifestation. It can be also understood in the social context as a mean of struggle for a certain community or a tool of social integration in the host country after achieving fame and wealth. Once totally integrated in the “host country”, the “departure country” shows interest on these movie makers who succeeded in becoming famous, and it even claim that they belong to it, which is very problematic for the psychological and artistic identity of there filmmakers.

At first Cinema was expensive and not very accessible for immigrants, so they turned toward its older form: Theater. Theater was an easy and less demanding form of cultural expression. It serves as a medium for the second generation of immigrants to challenge the stereotypes about their communities. Consequently, many theater companies raised in the name of migrant communities during the 1970s and the 1980s such as; “Kahina (1976-1982), Week-end à Nanterre (1977-1980) and Ibn Kaldoun (1978-1980)” (Derderian 2004). Most of these companies performed in Verlan slang, as a mixture of Arabo-Berber accent and regular French. The themes developed by the companies were mainly about immigration and the daily problems of foreign workers as well as the situation of migrant families. These themes were often presented in a humoristic way to reach the mind of the audience. The plays relayed more on improvisation than on a specific script (Derderian 2004, pp: 50-51).

According to Derderian “After the early 1980s, North African cultural expression moved from militant collective initiatives by amateur artists rooted in working-class suburban communities to professional forms of creative expression that targeted mainstream French audiences and relied more heavily on mainstream sources of diffusion and instrumental support.” (Derderian 2004, pp: 52). This phenomenon can be understood if we analyze the transformation that acquired at this historical moment, as communitarian forms of art weren’t enough to make a living for the artists, who wanted to turn into cinema and reach a wider audience, and the immigration theater has reached a certain maturity in its means and teams which enabled it to go to the next step.

France was a good place to study cinema and to do cinema compared to the destination countries, even if many stereotypes persisted about French filmmakers from non-European origins. France soon became thanks to its rich cultural atmosphere, the center of most of first Arab and North African filmmakers like Tewfik Saleh from Egypt and Mai Masri from Labanon… an important fact while dealing with these filmmakers, is to precise that most of them are immigrants before they become filmmakers. Maybe filmmaking was for them a dream from the time they were in their country of destination or maybe the desire to express a certain cultural esthetic came after the clash with the European society or maybe the second generation born there wanted to produce a cinema that resembles more to the color Beur.

Mehdi Charef went to france at first at the age of 12 to join his working father there. Charef spent his childhood around Nanterre and Gennevilliers Banlieux, where he shot many scenes of his filst and most known film Le Thé Au Harem d’Archimède on 1985. Ali Ghanem, went to France during the middle of the 1960s, and learned cinema by himself by reading specialized books and watching movies and other filmmakers on set. Ghanem shot his fist movie in 1970 Mektoub, which were considered as the first full length movie dealing with immigration by an immigrant filmmaker from North African origins (Rosen 1989, pp: 36). From the part of women, Assia Djebor represented the voice of women. Assia Djebor, who was a famous Algerian writer, thought it would be easier for her to communicate with the Algerian illiterate women through films. Thus, she made two highly original films, La Nouba Des Femmes Du Mont Chenoua in 1978 and La Zerda et Les Chants De L’oubli in 1982, before quitting cinema. In 1994, Malik Chibane released his film Hexagone, which was seen as a cinematographic success. The film Hexagone was a new stage in the development of Cinema made by French filmmakers from North African origins, since in terms of professional cinema Hexagone was a success in its plot, its audience rates and its money incomes. In spite of having “no formal training and no connections in the entertainment business” (Derderian 2004, pp: 64), Chibane was inspired by Week-end à Nanterre, and tells through his film the story of five days in the life of five North African Beur friends in the director’s neighborhood at Goussainville. Unlike Mehdi Charef or Rachid Bouchareb, Chiban’s film, which drew more than 60 000 viewers, was at first rejected by many production companies because of the ethnic composition of its actors. In addition, “Chibane received no financial support from the National Cinematography commission” (Derderian 2004, pp: 65), which is the main financial supporter of young artists in France, so the filmmaker was forced to relay on his own and work with a restrained small budget. According to Chibane, the ministries who supported the project like Bernard Tapie tend to see it as “a social initiative, not as a cultural one”. These facts show how much the French Republican model of secularism lucks in strategy while dealing with the promotion of minorities’ art production. If we compare the situation of French filmmaker from non-European origins to filmmakers from minority groups in Britain or the United States, we will notice that in these countries Art expression is very strong, because it is reinforced by minority positive laws and institutions, which help artists from minority groups to fund and share their work openly. Whereas, in France this kind of community based work is condemned because it is seen against the values of the republic, which favors cultural assimilation rather than communitarian originality. Under the rule of the socialist party, thing got worse for filmmakers and artists from North African backgrounds, after the paralyzation of the Cultural development Direction and the weakening of the Cultural Intervention fund (Marques 2002).

Other filmmakers like Farouk Beloufa, Taieb Louhici, Nacer Khemir, Ibrahim Tsaki and Merzak Allouche came from Tunisia and Algeria, because they luck of professional schools and cinematographic practices in their motherlands. Others simply came to France as students and became permanent residents, in a France seen as a paradise for cultural practice from the outside a hell for new-comers from the inside.

Cultural duality is a main feature of the cinematographic art of filmmakers from North African origins. Mehdi Charef and Mahmoud Zemmouri for instance, had to work to gain money to subsist and shot films to fulfill their artistic needs, they were inspired from their first home and second home, and lived all the push and pull situation at a sensitive time in French characterized by ethnic racism and social stereotypes. The battle to find a place in the second home and the bitter nostalgia about the first home, gave a special spontaneous esthetic to their work and something of a cultural duality (Odin 2002, pp32).

Many artists from North African origins tempted to focus on their artistic identity instead of their ethnic one, claiming that they should be seen as French artists like any other ones. However, some artists indirectly benefited from being an “Immigrant” or a “Beur”. These artists came to the scene to fill the roles of negatively represented North Africans, so they became famous out of that. The case of the actor Smain can illustrate this fact, as he had access to cinema by doing small role of the “negative Arab”. This can be applied to filmmakers as well; many became famous because government authorities wanted to give them the chance to produce their works out of political maneuvers or to fulfill the curiousity of French people from European origins about what happens in the “exotic” Banlieux. Smain and other actors and filmmakers never wanted to stand up as spokesmen of their community, even if they were in fact directly inspired from the situation of French people from North African origins in their artistic works. Apart from special cases like Jamal Debouz, who maintain good relationships with the country of origins of his parents, most artists prefer forgetting their ethnic specificity and melting in the French Republic colors, but stereotypes about their community always chasse them.

Filmmaking by French directors from North African origins is closely associated with what they call “immigration literature”. Both “immigration cinema” and “immigration literature” share the same themes and the same an “Apatrid” art strained between two countries, cultures and visions of the universe, as explained by Lassi. These forms of cultural expression, deal with “the socio-cultural context of production situated in a foreign land and victim of it’s non-integration in the art of the host country, same as their producers can’t be integrated easily” (Lassi 200’, pp 42-45). Christophe Ruggia did a cinematographic version of the novel Le Gone Du Chabâa 11 years after its publication. The novel by Azouz Beggag, describes the issues of cohabitation between the North African Arab minority culture and the dominant “French culture”, at the same time it explores the different strategies to overcome these cultural barriers between the two communities. Le Gone Du Chabâa and other literary productions by French novelists from North African origins are a major source of inspiration for filmmakers from the same background, which shows that different forms of expression can join and complement each other when dealing with the same theme. The cultural expressions by French artists from North African origins are today a real entity in the French arts, expressing the living and esthetic of a double culture carried by the North African communities in the French Republic.

Another important side of the filmmaking process when the French movie makers from North African origins turned professional is the issue of funding. Nowadays, most big productions made by these kinds of directors are funded by French film companies or government funds for cinema. Funding deals sometimes impose modifications on the original scenarios, or impose a psychological auto-censorship by the directors who make concessions about the reality of things to be produced. Further more, becoming professional means also addressing a much larger public, as “the western viewer becomes a major factor in the film equation” (Rosen 1989, pp: 36). The French viewer has many stereotyped expectations about the production of filmmakers from different backgrounds, which pushes as to question seriously the themes and the images presented by these directors. Do these filmmakers fulfill “the stereotyped expectations of the western audience” to sell their works? Is the reality so ugly to tell, that it is necessary to hide it by humor and stigmas?

“Not necessary!” the answer comes from the recent film Indigènes by Rachid Bouchareb. Indigènes was projected on May 2006 during the official competition of the Cannes festival. The film tells the story of more than 600 000 North African soldiers, who came to fight for France during the Second Great War in 1943 in the Italian front, and who died to liberate southern France from Toulon to Alsace. Indigènes stars four artists from North African origins: Jamel Debbouze, Samy Naceri, Rodchdy Zem, Sami Bouajila. The filmmaker Rachid Bouchareb was born in Paris in 1959 in an immigrant working large family. Bouchareb joined a cinema school after finishing his technical studies, and shot many films since then: Baton Rouge (1985), Cheb (1991), Little Senegal (2001)… The young man even founded a production company with some friends (Le Monde 2006). The ambitious director had the idea of making Indigènes many years before, but it was only made possible after several years of documentary research about the subject, 14.6 million euros of budget and the personal investment of the actor Jamel Debbouze, who convinced Morocco to help the production with military logistics. The importance of Indigènes is not only in its financial budget or the prizes it collected, it is in its symbolic importance as it tells the large audience a reality about their constructed past they weren’t ready to hear before. The main goal of Bouchareb’s was to tell the hidden story of the North African soldiers who died for France and who nobody remembers anymore in order to highlight a part of the French memory, which gives a positive shock to the negative stereotypes about North Africans. Yet, the film transcended its initial goals. After the tears of Bernadette Chirac and the emotions shared between the formal president of France Jacques Chirac and Jamel Debbouze, the government took measures the following day during the council of ministers to install an amendment about the fair payment of the 80 000 soldiers who fought for France during the great wars. The example of Indigenes and the work of its director Rachid Bouchareb, can illustrate the power of art and cultural forms of expressions sometimes on political decisions. However, according to the French news paper Le Canard Enchaîné, “the reaction of Jacques Chirac in the Cinema was nothing but presidential cinema” (Le Canard Enchainé 2006), as it explains that the measure taken by the Chirac government to help formal soldiers wasn’t out of the influence of the emotional film, but out of the sanctions imposed on France by the European Court of Justice since 2001. Indigènes makes us question the real influence of the artists and especially filmmakers in political decisions concerning their communities. As, we proved the power of art is only symbolic, but the real decisions are purely political.

Immigrants from North African origins started since their arrival to France to perform multiple forms of cultural expression to express their fears and expectations as well as their nostalgia towards their first home. Second generation artists and artists who newly came to France during the 1970s and 1970s, and who experienced the racist reality of the French society of that time, developed a working-class minority collective form of arts starting with theater and evolving towards cinema.

French filmmakers from North African origins have different stories but all tell the same story. They are Beur, working immigrants, cinema students, artist migrants but all relates in the same spontaneous bi-cultural way the daily life of their communities through simple stories. The goals behind the cinematographic productions are very different and problematic. Some used their situation to reach celebrity by playing the typical role or the stereotyped immigrant to benefit from support, others, produce art to show what happens in their communities as a sort of auto-biographical work, whereas many use cinema as a card of integration of the self and of the community in the French society. We noticed also that many artists prefer being seen as French rather than stigmatized as Arabs. From the government side, we notice a luck of minorities oriented political institutions in the French republic, which favors a more assimilations cultural strategy. Even when the government seems to react to new forms of memory art –like what happened with indigene- it is nothing but political maneuvers under the pressure of the international powers, which proves that art has only the power to provide symbols and challenge stereotypes but can’t effectively change politics.

A last point to think about is the image destination countries have about filmmakers in France from North African origins. Names like: Kassari Yassmine from Belgium, Nourdine Lakhmari from Norway, Daoud Oulad Syad from france and others became famous in Morocco for their works. Morocco even practices a sort of new pull factor towards these “Beurs who made it”, as the country sees them as Moroccans above all. There is even a festival dedicated to “immigration cinema” which takes places every year in Agadir: Agadir Ciné Festival. Here it is legitimate to ask: is the work of French filmmakers from North African origins is really an “Apatrid” art, having no real or deep cultural belonging to none of the first or second home? Or is it in the contrary a “Bi-patrid” art, enriching both identities with a synthetic form of expression?

REFERENCE LIST

- Bessière, Irène. 2002. Le Cinema de l’Immigration : Un Cinema Entre Deux Mondes ?. Maison des Sciences de l’Homme. Paris.
- Buffet, Helene. 1998. Actions Culturelles et Intégration en France des Populations Immigrées de Leurs Enfants. ENBIS. Université Claude Bernard Lyon I.
- D.F. « Indigènes » Aux Entournures. Le Canard Enchaîné. 27 September 2006.
- Dallet, Sylvie. 2001. Le Cinéma, Une Bombe à Fragmentation Coloniale. Marne-La-Vallé University.
- Derderian, Richard L. 2004. North Africans In Contemporary France: Becoming Visible. Palgrave Macmillan.
- Dudley, Andrew. 1999. Landscapes of Loss: The National Past in Postwar French Cinema. Film Quarterly. Vol. 54, No. 1. Autumn 2000. PP: 45-49.
- Henderson, Heike. 1998. Writing New Identities: Gender, Nation and Immigration in Contemporary Europe. The Quarterly. Vol 71, No 4. Autumn. PP: 420-421.
- Mandelbaum, Jacques. Portrait: Rachid Bouchareb, Au Nom De Tous Les Siens Morts Pour La Patrie. Le Monde. 29 June 2006.
- Mardayé, Tony & El Harim, Karim. 2002. Les Noirs El Les Arabes Au Sein De L’espace Public Ou La Revendication Egalitaire. University of Lille publications.
- Marques, Cardoso. 2002. Images de Portugais en France: Immigration et cinema. L’Harmattan. Paris.
- Roberts, Martin. 1998. “Beraka”: World Cinema and the global Culture Industry. Cinema Jornal. Vol 37, No 3. spring. PP: 62-82.
- Rosen, Mriam. 1989. The Uprooted Cinema : Arab filmmakers Abroad. Middle East Report. No 159. Jully, August. PP: 34-37.
- Slavin, David H. 1988. French Colonial Film Before and After Itto: from Berber Myth to Race War. French Histortical studies. Vol 21, No 1. Winter. PP: 125-155.
- Tapsoba, clément. 1999. Couleur Café et Pièces d’Identité : Cinéma et Immigration. Ecrans d’Afrique. N 24. Deuxième semestre.
Tcheuyao, alexie & Lassi, Etienne-Marie. 2004. Réecriture Filmique et discours Sur l’Immigration : Le gone du Châaba d’azouz Begag. Tangence. N75. Eté. 41-62.

The Kibboutzs means in Hebrew union or group. Kibboutzs are collective villages situated in Israel which were created by the Zionist movement during the beginning of the twentieth century as the first germ of Jewish Nationalism in the land of Palestine. These rural communities were mainly influenced by the ideals of Tolstoy about Associative Socialism and pure egalitarian rural society. Yet, the Kibboutzs have evolved today to a more complex communitarian structures, including not only agrarian activities but also industry and services since the creation of the state of Israel during the middle of the last century.

Originally, the idea of Kibboutzs required a deep political militant spirit, which was born in the mind of the early Zionist thinkers and settlers. Many ideologues and pioneers of the Zionist movement as well as important military officers lived in the Kibboutzs until the 1980s. However, the spirit of the community life went through a serious economic, demographic and moral crisis since the 1970s, which reached its highest level with the crisis of 1990. Nevertheless, the Kibboutzs remain an important aspect of the building of the state of Israel and the implementation of the Zionist ideals throughout the 20th century. In addition, the 300 Kibboutzs that exist today in Israel are seen as an example of prestigious life style, as they learned how to adapt to the new challenges of modern life.

In this article, we will try to explain what the Kibboutzs is and how they function politically and economically. We will also try to explain the socialist ideological inspirations of these communities as well as the mutation of the Kibboutzs since 1970 to adapt to modern life. Furthermore, we will focus on the contradictory discourse of the left wing in Israel, which calls for the construction of an Israeli-Arab state and at the same time take off the land from Palestinians to build its ideal socialist communities. We will also explore some of the problems the Kibboutznikim (residents of the Kibboutzs) are facing today.

According to Encyclopedia Judaica the Kibboutzs are “communities deliberately formed by its members, for agricultural work. There are no private properties in the Kibboutzs, as the income of work is divided between equally between the members of the community and their families” (Encyclopedia Judaica 2006). The Kibboutzs are based on the values of equality and common good, which favors the unification of the community around common values and the offering of welfare services to everyone without distinction of sex or social class. Yet, the Kibboutzs is also a Nationalist Jewish Organization, which helped in the colonization and the building of the state of Israel by Zionist pioneers. “These communities are in reality how the early thinkers imagined the whole country of Israel but on a bigger scale, by focusing on the ideals of collective entrepreneurship and individual engagement, as to guarantee the economic wellbeing of the members of the group” (Ekkert-Jafé 1986).

The urban architecture of the Kibboutzs is following the same original design. At the center, there is the core infrastructures like the administrations, the auditorium, the schools and the hospital, surrounded by the residential area then the several acres of greenery (Ekkert-Jafé 1986). Nowadays, the Kibboutzs has expended beyond the borders of the gardens to include the newly build services and industrial areas.

Politically speaking, Kibboutzs are very egalitarian, since there are no elected representatives and it is at the level of the General assembly that decisions are taken. Thus, we notice that some Kibboutzs started integrating more and more functional structures from the democratic model of governance.

Some Arab Kibboutzs tried to develop in Israel but have failed, because the Kibboutzs are above all Jewish Nationalist entities, which were created in a specific purpose. Yet, it would be very positive if Palestinians or other Arab states can benefit from the experience of the Kibboutzs as long as they adapt it to their own way of living and to their ideological aims (Donath, 1969).

There is no money circulation in the Kibboutzs and no salary system. The structure is build to support in an egalitarian way or the members in terms of food, clothing, daily goods and all possible needs. In the distribution of goods no distinction on socio-economic basis are allowed, and no sex differentiations are tolerated neither apart in Jewish Religious Kibboutzs. However, a small amount of money is given to the community members in a regular basis in order to be spent outside the Kibboutzs on goods that don’t exist inside.

The dispatching of the work is circular and includes all active members in the community families. Work division is rational and exploitation materials belong to the community, as preached in socialist ideals.

The Kibboutzs are autonomous districts ruled from within as an independent municipality. They are treated by the state as autonomous politically and economically regarding its free decision making and free market trade, but still owe taxes to the state of Israel and carry its National flag. Nevertheless, the Kibboutzs by the force of history and ideological affinities got united as three main federations. The need to create federations came from the pressures imposed by the outside world on the Kibboutzs to adapt themselves and to cope with the governmental strategies on education and other issues. Since then, four major Kibboutz federations raised; “the Unified Kibboutzik Movement is the major Kibboutz federation with more than half the settlements affiliated to it. This federation is called commonly Takam in Hebrew, and is supporting the Israeli Labor Party “The Mapai”. The second federation is called Kibboutz Artzi, with more than 30% of affiliation. Artzi consolidated its position after its fusion with the Takam 7 years ago, as it shares with it the same socialist values. However, the Artzi remains more radical and Zionaist. Kibboutz Dati is the third biggest federation. This federation is a religious Kibboutz influences by socialist ideas. The last the religious orthodox Kibboutzs created by the Ahoudat Israel party” (Raphael 1980, pp 32).

We must objectively see the Kibboutz experience, not as an ideal model of the implementation of associative socialism in Israel, but more of a functional solution to the problematic of settlement and management of the flows of migrants coming during different Aliyas. In fact, at the beginning of the Kibboutz experience, many models were tested unfortunately none was useful, which led to the egalitarian form of division of work as an imposed solution to manage the problems of early settlements. Thus, the experience was a small laboratory of experimentations that served in the shaping of the state of Israel later on.

The Russian socialist thinker and writer gave the inspiration of the Kibboutzs building in Israel to the early Eastern European Jewish communities. Consequently, the Hapoel Hatzayer party built the first rural anarchist communities in 1908. Degania the first Kibboutz even constructed was built by European socialist settlers in 1909 next to fertile agricultural lands of the Tabaria. Other Kibboutzs followed in 1912 and 1913 following the same rural model, as to implement the Zionist plans. The early Kibboutzs were utilitarian for the poor immigrants, since the lands were used for intensive agriculture to provide the populations with food, but soon the exploitations and the populations of the Kibboutzs grew and so did the level of life and welfare. To understand the values of the Kibboutz, we must go deeper in the Zionist ideology behind it. The Zionists aimed through the Kibboutzs to build not only a new community but also a “New Man” (Raphael 1980, pp: 56) for the promised land of their ancestors, as they claim. It is not a socialist ideal but also a religious one related to the promise of a salvation for the Jews of the world.

Under the British rule, and while Europe was sinking in war, the Mapai movement formed a new form of Kibboutzs. The Mapai was aware that agrarian Kibboutzs can’t survive for a long time in the wave of industrialization, so it decided to integrate some light forms of industrial infrastructure in the Kibboutzs. Since that time many Kibboutzs had the follow the example of the Mapai Kibboutzs, and fully integrated the secondary and tertiary sectors by the 1970s. At that precise time, The Kibboutzs were facing a problematic economic and demographic crisis under the rule of the government of the Right wing Likoud party. By the 1980s, the communities had to unify in form of federations to face the government pressures and to review its economic strategy towards a less agrarian economy opened to modern market competition. Nowadays, Kibboutzs resurrected more strongly after the heavy crisis of 1990, since the Kibboutz population is one of the richest in the whole country of Israel.

Unfortunately, the Kibboutz structures are facing a moral crisis after the structural changes it experienced during the last 30 years. The values developed by the Kibboutz communities are challenged by the wind of modernity. The pressure of modern like imposed many changes in the rhythm of life of these people. Daily collective meals aren’t observed regularly anymore, and many residents start seeking for outside work opportunities, whereas foreign workers Jews or even Arabs are introduced to do the work. As regards the education of children, it became a personal affair instead of a collective one, as children are in nowadays Kibboutzs spending their like in the family’s house instead of the community dorms. Thus, these changes must be seen as an evolution and an adaptation to modern life not as a menace to a stagnant way of being as Zionist orthodox Kibboutz dwellers tend to see it. Other changes affected the community, as the introduction of “personal budgets” in opposite to the early Kibboutzs where money circulation was banned. Consequently, the Kibboutz system in Israel is going through a real crisis of values. Many Kibboutz residents start to move to large cities and the community values are regressing (Donath, 1969).

Modern American thinker Noam Chomsky, in his very important book on the Kibboutz, tries to reveal the reality behind the utopic socialist mask of the Kibboutzs, since he spent a 7 weeks field study in one of the Kibboutzs next to the coastal city of Haifa. Among the contradiction that Chomsky noticed, there is the deep feeling of racism among the Kibboutz members towards Arabs, whereas the socialist ideals are normally Universalists (Chomsky 2002). The Kibboutzs are even built on lands taken by force from Palestinians and Israeli Arabs, which is a serious contradiction with the discourse of the building of an Israeli-Arab state hold by the left wing parties. Chomsky also noticed a deep tense relationship with the Israeli state, and dissolution of the complementarity that existed between the early Zionist ideologues and the Kibboutz dwellers, since the Likoud party came to power (Chomsky 2002). Chomsky added in his work “Understanding Power”, that the group in the Kibboutzs is oppressing the free will of the individual, for instance military service and community work is taken very seriously, which may give birth to violence. What is revealing about the work of Chomsky, which took place in the 1960s, is that the Anarchic socialist equalitarian model that Israel tend to present to the world about the Kibboutzs was challenges, showing that these communities are an important and unique model in the world but yet not a perfect one.

In spite of the economic and moral problems and far from the illusions of the rural associative socialist utopia, one should admit that the Kibboutz remain the main Nationalist Movement in Israel and that it is somehow thanks to the effort of its groups that Israel exist in part today, since it gave Israel a complete communitarian experience to learn from. Nowadays the Kibboutz population in Israel enjoys a big prestige and lives a wealthy life, in spite of the massive movement of many Kibboutz dwellers to big Israeli cities to fulfill a more modern existence. According to encyclopedia Judaica, there is more than 269 Kibboutz in Israel today, with a population of more than 120 500 inhabitants from the Golan to the Red Sea living in small semi-agrarian groups.

Kibboutzs started as a manifestation of social Zionism and the will to make a “New Man” for the Promised Land on Palestine, following the ideals of Tolstoi and associative socialism. Gradually, the Kibboutzs became a machine of Zionist elites and a structure to assimilate new immigrants from different parts of the world and to teach them the language and the values of the state of Israel. However, the challenge of modernity forced the Kibboutzs to adapt to the modern world by becoming more flexible and including light industry, services, and money. Yet, it is legitimate to ask whether the Kibboutzs are doomed to perish as they already accomplished the aim they were designed for before 1948, or would they persist in new forms to face the future challenges Israel would be facing with its neighbors. It is also important to remind how much it is important to study the structures of the Kibboutzs as unique models in the world and to throw lessons for the construction of adapted democracies in the MENA region.

REFERENCE LIST

- Eyclopedia Judaica, online, 2006
- Chomsky, Noam. 2002. Understanding Power: The Indispensable Chomsky. Peter R. Mitchell. New Press.
- Raphael, Joseph. 1980. The Communal Future: the Kibboutzs and the Utopian Dilemma. Sciences Socials des Religions. Vol 49, No 32. pp: 239-240.
- Ekert-Jaffé, Olivia. 1986. Effets et limites des aides financières aux familles: une expérience et un modèle. Population (French Edition). 41e Année, No. 2 (Mar., 1986). pp. 327- 357.
- Dieckhoff, Alain. 1989. Les trajectoires territoriales du Sionisme. Vingtième Siècle. Revue d'histoire. No. 21 (Jan., 1989), pp. 29-43.
- Barkai, Haim. 1979. Productivity and Factor Allocation in Kibbutz Farming and Manufacturing .Revue économique .Vol. 30, No. 1, Economie administree (Jan., 1979), pp. 144-161.
- Leibovici, Franck. 2003. Esquisse d'une histoire des Français en Israël. Vingtième Siècle. Revue d'histoire. No. 78 (Apr., 2003), pp. 3-17.
- Donath, Doris. 1964. La population juive d'Israël. Population (French Edition). 19e Année, No. 5 (Oct., 1964), pp. 941-956.
- Donath, Doris. 1968. Développement et sous-développement en Israël: aspects socio-culturels. Revue Française de Sociologie. Vol. 9, No. 4 (Oct., 1968), pp. 522-536.
- Danath, Doris.1969. L'intégration économique des immigrants nord-africains en Israël et des Juifs nord-africains en France (Essai d'étude comparative). Revue Française de Sociologie .Vol. 10, No. 4 (Oct., 1969), pp. 491-514.

A state is a political body which has well defined boundaries of its sovereign territories. A state must also have effective administration to rule its citizens, legal and defense structures to apply its laws as well as a taxation system to cover its expenses. In opposition to tribes and chiefdoms, states are the only sociopolitical systems which are not based on kinship but on citizenship. Archaic and modern states have different models, which have specific structures.

Some Sufi orders for religious and historical reasons succeeded in founding autonomous states inside other sovereign states. In Senegal for instance, many clerical city-states and Jihadi villages emerged as independent beings following some particular historical events. These city-states in Senegambia enjoy total autonomy from the central state, and run their territories as independent structures in all fields. In Kurdistan, the Sufi Derwish in Boiveh has a total control over their religious ceremonial lives and autonomous running of their administration and services. Yet, the Boiveh Derwish brotherhood can’t be considered fully as a state because it is still undergoing many pressures by the Iranian state and has no historical impregnation in time.

This paper will examine the characteristics of two main Senegambian autonomous regions: Touba and Pakao. The fist is a Sufi city-state of the Mouride brotherhood; the second is a region were autonomous Jihadi villages that run themselves in a local kind of organization. It would try to see if Touba and Pakao can be called States. Then, it would try to analyze the features of the Boiveh Derwish community with regards to modern state characteristics. This paper would focus mostly on the ceremonial, the economic and the administrative aspects of autonomy in the three studied cases.

The Example Of Touba

In 1206 Senegal was already a state under Sundieta Keita. It has a 44 points constitution an army and administrative structures. The first mention of a state in Senegal was in the early 9th century (Chronology, Sahel / West Africa). Therefore, the Senegambian has an important heritage from archaic states.

Touba is a very interesting case study in modern Senegal, as it is one of the rare deeply organized autonomous city-states in the world. “Touba is a Muslim holy city, and it is brand new. The city was founded in 1887 by Ahmadou Bamba Mbacké, the Sufi who established the Mouride brotherhood. Its construction was initiated in 1926, and its great mosque was inaugurated only in 1963” (Ross 2005, pp: 243). What is interesting about Touba, is not its being Senegal’s second largest city or its spiritual importance for million of followers of the Mouride brotherhood, but it is its status as an autonomous rural community, functioning as an independent state under the rule of the Khalifa General.

The phenomenon of the appearance of “autonomous Muslim towns” in West Africa and Senegambian history is mainly due to the introduction of Islam in the region. Educated clerical lineages appeared by the 17th century, and occupied important functions in royal courts and magical services. Thus, in exchange of their services, the clerical lineages obtained land where they established schools for Islamic education. Sufi brotherhoods rose only during the 19th century. Enjoying a special status under occupation, they started building their own private towns with the expansion of Islam in Senegal (Ross 2005).

Ceremonial life is very important in Touba as a holy city for the Mouride brotherhood. We may call Touba a Theocratic city state, because of the religious nature of the leadership system. The Khalifa General is a direct descendent of Ahmadou Bamba and is supposed to rule from a divine inspiration due to his position as the sheikh of the Sufi brotherhood. Ceremonial life is totally independent from the Senegalese Government, as the Mouride developed in Touba their own religious structures and infrastructures as it is the case in their other cities like: Darou Karim, Porokhane, and Touba Bagdad… The brotherhood designed a whole religious urban design to consolidate its power among its followers. The great central mosque, mausoleums, houses of the sheikh, religious schools and other buildings are there to remind of the holiness and religious autonomy of the town.

Touba is legally an independent city like the city of Madina-Gounass. “In Touba’s case the special status is base on conditions during the colonial period, when the French authorities came to an accommodation with the Mouride brotherhood… Since 1976 it has the status of communauté rurale autonome, or “autonomous rural community”” (Ross 2005, pp: 258). According to Dr. Ross’s research, for the Mourides it is obvious that Touba must be autonomous because of its spiritual value, but legally it is thanks to a 1928 lease proving that the city is constructed on a private property. As a result of this special status, Touba has its own administration, provides its own services and has nothing to do with state taxes or the intervention of government authorities, even if the president of Senegal is a Mouride follower. Touba also has its special laws imposed on all residents and visitors. The city’s law is a moral code inspired from the Islamic Chari’a and the teachings of the spiritual leaders, like: banishing songs, cigarettes and other practices, which are seen non-Islamic. Thus, punishment can be imposed on whom violates this moral code by the judiciary body of the city.

Economically, Touba was initially an agrarian town like other Jihad states in the region “where students paid their “tuition fees” by toiling their masters’ fields during agricultural seasons” (Ross 2005, pp: 250). Nowadays, agriculture is still important for Touba’s economy, but it has more of a tertiary sector based economy, as it provides mainly schooling and religious services. Touba don’t get any loans of financial support from the state. It gets its resources from the important contributions of the followers of the Mouride brotherhood in Senegal and other countries of the region. Consequently we can say that Touba is economically independent.

As we’ve proved, Touba can truly be considered as state. Touba benefits from the historical heritage of the Senegambian other city-states, and has developed under the French regime a special status. Therefore, Touba enjoys nowadays total independence in terms of religious practices, administrative and legal institutions as well as economic welfare.

The Example of Pakao

Ha Pulaarim is the social cast of fighters in the Senegambian region. The Pulars, who fought for Islam in the name of Jihad, moved to Futa Jalon after the defeat of Casamense, conquered the Mandinka and became the dominant social class in the Pakao villages since the 17th century. Therefore, many religiously based “Marabout states” raised on the region of Pakao since that period.

The Mandinka region of Pakao includes fertile lands and 160 miles of the Casamence River where many autonomous villages lays. In terms of administration, we can’t say that the Pakao villages are autonomous. “Administratively, Pakao lies in the department of Sédhiou, named for its capital. The department is divided into five districts. The one administrated from Djendé, near Sédhiou, subsumes Pakao. Karantaba, lying in Suna on the south bank, is the Tanaff district. The head of a district supervises the census and tax, provides identity cards, and some instances resolves disputes” (Shaffer & Cooper 1980, pp: 27). Hence, politically and administratively the Pakao can’t be called an autonomous region, since it pays taxes to the central state and even benefits from the state’s services like schooling and healing. Yet, “the idea that villages are independent of each other is very much a part of social ethic of Pakao” (Shaffer & Cooper 1980, pp: 44). The villages run themselves as autonomous unities since Islam destroyed the kinship system during the 19th century.

Ceremonial practices are impregnated deeply in the Mandinka people, as the villages were found first of all upon Islamic values. The Marabouts are the Islamic clerics, who claim to have supernatural powers of healing and predicting the future as oracles. Each Pakao village has its Marabouts, who maintain the link with orthodox Islam by going to pilgrimage. Islam, is present is a local form in all aspects of life like marriage, prayer or death (Shaffer & Cooper 1980, pp: 39-41).The Imams enjoy a very important role in the Pakao system as a leader of the prayers and a holy man, whereas a secular chief is designated to rule administrative and daily life issues of the village’s populations.

“Pakao is primarily a sedentary agricultural society dependent on a good rainy season for successful harvest” (Shaffer & Cooper 1980, pp: 28). Farming and agriculture are the main activities of the Pakao economy. Pakao villages were organized in cooperative associations to keep their autonomy and improve the incomes of their people, but in was a weak experience. Pakao villages aren’t totally independent from government programs and subventions.

Pakao villages are autonomous as small communities, but can’t be called States because they depend in many fields on the central state like: education, administration, taxation…

The Example Of The Boiveh Derwishs

Kurdish people never had a real state. The Kurdish people were most of their history living between the borders of other dominant countries, even if they repetitively claimed their right to a sovereign Nation State. Yet, The historical complex about not having a state was translated in the construction of autonomous Sufi communities like the Kaderi Derwish community which lives in Boiveh in Iran today.

Many Kurdish Sufi Derwishs moved from Iraq, during the late 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, to Iran. The Iranian government gave the communities lands in Boiveh where they could grow corps and practice freely their religious activities under the shelter of their sheikh.

Administratively, the situation of Boiveh is very problematic. The pilgrims from Iraq come every year to the town to visit their Sheikh, and the allegiance to the spiritual leader and kinship relationships goes beyond the borders of Iran and Iraq. However, Boiveh population has to follow the Iranian government in terms of the implementation of the Iranian educational system and compulsory military service as well as other administrative formalities (Moser 1987).

The administrative and other aspects of life seem very mild for the Boiveh Darwishs, who believe that “faith goes in daily work not only in ceremony” (Moser 1987). In fast, ceremonial life is at the forefront of the life of this community. Daily Dhikr ceremonies take place every day and auto-flagellation actions are administrated by adults and children in presence of the Sheikh Koha Mohammed, using snakes, electricity, swords, fire... The Sheik and his offspring are seen as holy people, who are in contact with the prophet and god, so they follow the path of initiation since their early years to get closer to god through the Sheikh. The sheik has also the authority to build mosques to consolidate the position of his tarika, as people come and work voluntarily and without payment following the words of their spiritual leader. A strict religious education and initiation is also one of the aspects of the autonomy of Boiveh. Yet, people in the town aren’t all obliged to assist to ceremonies and don’t get punished for that, since according to the Sufis religion is a personal practice (Moser 1987).

Economically, Boiveh is an agrarian town. People are farmers and merchants and work at the same time in the lands of the Sheikh and his sons without getting paid, as a sign of love for the Sheik. One of the men in the documentary even said: “We work for the Sheikh, because the Sheikh works for god” (Moser 1987). In the documentary we didn’t have enough proves about the economic autonomy of Boiveh (Moser 1987).

The Sufi Darwish brotherhood of Boiveh can’t be called a state, because it doesn’t have the powerful administration of economic system a state should have. In addition, Boiveh depends on the Iranian government in many ways like in military service and education despite its strong religious autonomy.

In this article we’ve seen three different autonomous regions that try to run their issues independently from the central state. In the case of Touba, it is very interesting to notice how notorious a Sufi brotherhood can be to benefit from all legal, religious and economic autonomy from the Senegalese state. Pakao which inherited the autonomous aspect of the Jihadi states can’t be considered as a full state because of the economic problems and the strong administrative presence of the state in its structures. As regards the Boiveh Sufi brotherhood, we noticed the prevalence of religious ceremonies over all other aspects of life. Consequently, Boiveh can be seen as a highly religiously autonomous town in the Shia state of Iran. Yet, the sate of refugees doesn’t allow the Boiveh people to claim more administrative autonomy.

As Dr. Ross noted in his article, we can say that maybe these forms of autonomous city-states provide natural examples for the success of a Globalized world where the Nation sate has less authority over its regions, which have specific needs and historical heritage.

REFERENCE LIST

- Ross, Eric. (2005). From ‘marabout republics' to ‘autonomous rural communities': autonomous Muslim towns in Senegambia. in African Urban Spaces in Historical Perspective, edited by Steven J. Salm & Toyin Falola. Rochester: University of Rochester Press.
- Morsen, Brian. (1987). Dervishes of Kurdistan. Disapearing World. Discovery Chanel. With anthropologist André Singer.
- Shaffer, Matt & Cooper, Christine. (1980). Mandinko. The Ethnography of a West African Holy Land. Waveland Press. Illinois.

Al Akhawayn University’s Hassani Club organized on April 28 its yearly edition of the Hassani Day. This event aims to promote the Hassani culture among the university’s culture by programming a day with many cultural activities. The program includes a big exposition of the Hassani rich handy craft by people from the southern regions of the country. The day also was the occasion for the guests to present tea and special corn and milk drink to the visitors. In addition, during night time a singing and dancing show was given in the restaurant for AUI students by professional Hassani performers, as to share the beauty and fun of the entertaining Hassani musical heritage.

Throughout the Hassani day, I noticed while assisting to the program that the Hassani culture has its own specificity. The Hassani handy craft is mainly composed of local material taken from the nature like silver, leather, wood and cloth. All the decoration was very simple with a clear influence of the Black African forms of art especially in the jewelry. The handy craft shows a big cultural mixture with Mauritania and Mali and other West African regions, since the symbols and material is quite the same. Among the symbols that were represented in the craft we can easily distinguish the Islamic influence, as the croissant with the star is present on the cloths and the decorations. Magical symbols are very important too, because in some of the jewelry and handy craft I noticed the traces of magical squares which act as talismans. The Hassani Music is very simple and Rhythmic and relies on local Hassani poetry and slow movements. Further more, the Hassani food is very different from the rest of Morocco. Hassani alimentation is mainly based on rice and animal milk as well as corn, whereas the Moroccan food in mainly based on bread and cattle meat. The dressing is also obviously very different. Hassani people were the Melhfa for the women and the Daraiya for the men like Mauritanian and other desert people, and we notice very rare people wearing modern European style cloths as most of them wear it under their traditional cloths.

Even if Hassani people share some tribal values with the rest of Moroccan people, they still constitute an anthropological exception. In Hassani culture the women play the most important role in the family. Women are preferred big and tall as a sign of local beauty and social wealth. The cast system is very rigid, and the Arab Bedouins lay on the top of the social cast. Hassani people even tend to see other Moroccans as inferior to them, as they are more tribally organized and still respect the traditions. Islam has a very important place in education and Coranic schools for youngsters are very common in the south. Hassani people have their own pace of life. They don’t like to rush themselves and do things very slowly for enjoying every moment of life, so being quick or active is seen as inconvenient. The southern regions of Morocco are also known for the strong oral tradition and the importance of classical and local poetry, which is present in most of the men or family reunions.

Hassani culture is very important and rich for the Moroccan melting pot. Yet, other Moroccan people know very few things about this culture because of years and years of psychological distance. The Sahara conflict and the special treatment of the Southern regions as well as rumors played a negative role in creating stereotypes and antipathies between the Hassani people and the other Moroccans. In stead of doing a politic of cultural openness and assimilation the responsibles of the Sahara issues tended to impose cultural separation. Consequently, we see no aspect of Hassani art or culture inside the big cities like musical tapes or cloths and no Hassani cultural books were published.

I think that to promote the Hassani culture among other Moroccans many actions should be done from both sides and at the small and decision making level. First of all, Hassani culture should be present in the Moroccan education from primary school. At least pictures of Hassani people and texts about Hassani story and poetry should be included in manuals, as to permit the self identification of Hassani children with these manuals and the familiarization of other children with these people that they see as blue zombies nowadays. At a bigger level, I think Hassani culture department should be includes in Moroccan public universities and anthropological studies should be done and published by the state. Local tourism can play an important role in knowing more the culture of the region. Tourism agencies should stop their orientalist discourse about the exotic south and try to show a more realistic image about the region. On the smaller level, Hassani students in big cities like Agadir and Rabat should try to mix more with others and even organize cultural days instead of living in isolation. The civil society is very active in the south, so it would be easy to organize expositions and music festivals about the Hassani culture. Media also has a very important role, as it should stop showing sand and palms and start giving more importance to the human potential and the local culture as to broadcast it to the rest of Morocco.

The Hassani Culture is very rich and can be an added value to the Moroccan melting pot with its originality and Saharian African influences, if many measures would be taken. Both Hassani people and other Moroccans should cross their cultural distance and build bridges that transcend political issues through: education, tourism, festivals, Medias… We live in a kind of distorted image about each other and the rest of Moroccans tend to see the south with an internal orientalist perception. This perception can’t easily change especially while dealing with a rigid Hassani tribal mind. Yet, cultural communication is the only way to unite different people in the same constructed country.

Chiefdoms are groups of people, either having the same ancestor or from different origins, who are led by a chief. Chiefdoms are between the tribe and the state, and more close to archaic states where leadership was hereditary. Chiefdoms often have Military and defined borders like a State, and a sedentary agrarian economy like the Tribe, with a linear inherited leadership powers. Kinship is very important in chiefdoms, even class distinctions are based on the kinship system, as the closer you are to the living chief, the more access to resources you have. Citizenship within the chiefdom is defined by the kinship (Senior/Junior) system, which allows integrating different newcomers and ensuring their complete assimilation.

In this paper we will study two examples of chiefdoms, the Swazi chiefdom of Swaziland and the Rapa Nui chiefdom of Easter Island. We will be examining why the Swazi chiefdom developed into a state, while Rapa Nui chiefdom collapsed into numerous small and warring clans, by explaining the dissimilarity between the two cases in terms of political, economic, religious and geographical differences. To explain the Swazi chiefdom model, we will refer to dependency theory of the Marxist thinker Andre Gunderfrunk and to imagined communities’ theory by Benedict Anderson. Where, we will explain Rapa Nui chiefdom model, by focusing on two of its major aspects: isolation, and ceremonial domination.

The Swazi Chiefdom

The Swazi are Bantu speaking people, who call themselves Khwi Khwi and who are situated in North East and central South Africa. The Swazi fled across the river from the paranoid authoritarian Zulu leader Shaka. “They carried with them the heritage of all immigrants – the knowledge, memories and experiences of the past from societies they had left behind. With this they were able to shape their lives anew, adapting as they forgot.” (Kuper 2002, p: 3). The Swazi uses Shaka’s system to protect themselves from the Zulu, while adapting to the new conditions of life and organisation. Mswati, who is a Zulu from the Dlamini clan, is the founder of the Swazi. Swaziland became a 6704 squares miles state during the 1830s. It didn’t achieve its independence until 1968 after a long struggle.

Politically, “the Swazi developed their particular system, a dual monarchy that was unique in some respects but which fits into the general category of centralized chiefdoms. At the head was a hereditary king, titled by his people Ngwenyama (Lion), and a queen mother, Ndlovukazi (Lady Elephant).” (Kuper 2002, p: 3). The Swazi chiefdom is organized following a complex chiefs hierarchy, going from the Paramount chief, who is the king, to principle chiefs, district chiefs and area chiefs. This chiefdom hierarchy is organised in parallel with the kinship system of Senior/Juniors, where the power is divided according to the closeness to the paramount chief. The socio-political system of the Swazi is an inclusive one, as they invent fictive kinship to construct the state and include all kinds of different people. This phenomena inclusion can be explained by Benedict Anderson’s theory about imagined communities. Anderson claims that heterogynous groups can all be united in one state by a procedure of imagining a common ancestor of common focal points in a fictive past, which can give birth to nationalist feelings (Anderson 1991). According to the same thinker “A state has elastic boundaries, beyond which lie other nations” (Anderson 1991, p: 65), this elasticity of symbolic boundaries was well used by the Swazi to include many people in junior lineages and assimilate their cultures in the big melting pot. Yet, the white people living in Swaziland are still somehow seen as an anomaly inside the fictive kinship system because they belong to a totally different race and culture. Another political reason about why the Swazi chiefdom turned to a state is the need to build an organised state in terms of military and taxes to protect themselves from outside treat. In addition, contrary to the Zulu, the Swazi king was very friendly with the British authorities and allowed them to bay land in Swaziland. This friendship made the British welcome the idea of the creation of a State for the Swazi people. We can conclude that the Swazi chiefdom, have two major socio-political qualities which enabled them to turn to a State, which are: inclusiveness and adaptation to change.

The Swazi land is a diverse place and has an abundance of water. “The mountains slope into the undulating plains of more fertile and warmer midlands, which in turn, gradually give place to bush country where cattle thrive throughout the year on green foliage.” (Kuper 2002). This tropical climate and diversity of land allows intensive agriculture and having livestock. Yet, this kind of economy suffers from many problems like limited agricultural lands and erosion because of massive water falls. Moreover, the kinship system gives more access to recourses to Senior lineages. However, the Swazi can always adapt to new situation by making the Juniors Seniors in case of revolts. A major aspect of the Swazi economy is the possibility to go to South Africa to work in mining in case, so they have the chance to expend to neighbouring countries not like the Rapa Nui people who are limited in an island.

Religion and ceremonies are very important for the Swazi, but not as important as for the Rapa Nui chiefdom. The Swazi cosmology “does not … place a value on suffering as a mean to happiness or salvation” (Kuper 2002, p: 61), not like the Rapa Nui chiefdom which impose on its people hard ceremonies to please the ancestors. Swazi people have specialists in rituals and believe in witchcraft, but it’s mostly utilitarian practices for daily needs of to legitimize the kinship system.

Geography is very revealing, if we analyze why the Swazi turned into a state and the Rapa Nui didn’t. External threat and Geopolitical calculations ultimately was a crucial cause behind the State building, as the Swazi were obliged to get organized to face the Zulu and other neighbours. The fact that Swaziland is situated inside South Africa pushed it to think about foreign policy and economic and political deals to develop it self. We can explain the relationship between Swaziland and South Africa using dependency theory of Gunderfrunk. South Africa plays the role of the Centre and Swaziland the Periphery. South Africa uses Swaziland as a buffer country to protect itself from Mozambican threats, and exploit its workers as cheep labour in mining industry and the military in Swaziland is totally controlled by South Africa.

The Swazi chiefdom succeeded in building a state thanks to its political inclusive and adaptative system, its economic expansion by immigration and its geographic feeling of threat and dependency on South Africa. These reasons allowed the Swazi to start the procedure of imagining its community and construction a state out of a Chiefdom.

The Rapa Nui Chiefdom

Easter Island was called Rapa Nui 300 years ago. Easter Island “is an island in the south Pacific Ocean belonging to Chile. Located 3,600 km west of continental Chile and 2,075 km east of Pitcairn Island, it is one of the most isolated inhabited islands in the world. It was given its common name of "Easter" because the first recorded European visit by a Dutch Admiral Jacob Roggeveen was on Easter Sunday, 1722.” (Wikipedia). The people of Rapa Nui lived in a chiefdom system before the arrival of the Europeans. The society was divided between the Long Ears, who were the dominant group, and the Short Ears, who were dominated and marginalized. The unequal division of power and the frustration of the Short Ears led to a big revolt which ended in the fragmentation of the Chiefdom in mini-clans.

Politically, the Rapa Nui chiefdom was divided following the chiefdom leadership system where there is a Paramount chief and other local chiefs. The Paramount chief was called Ariki Mau (Bird Man). Yet, the failure of the paramount chief to rule and to be fair towards his people led to the revolt of the Short Ears (Reynolds 1995). One of the aspects of failure of the political chief is his claim of holding the Mana and communicating with the gods, which made him turn arrogant and imposing draconian works on his subjects to please the Ancestors. The arrogance of the chief was a feature of all the Seniors in the Rapa Nui community, as the Short Ears were treated with discrimination and lived at the margin of the society. Consequently, no intermarriage or social connections were allowed between the Juniors and the Seniors in this locked rigid system. The leadership among the Rapa Nui was not transmitted through heritage but through an ongoing competition, where only Long Ears can participate (Reynolds 1995). This contested leadership created instability in the system, contrary to the Swazi linear leadership system which ensures stability. All these factors ended in a harsh revolt of the Short Ears after the suicide of the work master who felt no gratitude from his superiors (Reynolds 1995).

Economically, Easter Island suffered from an over population growth combined with a shortage of resources, which made the situation very vulnerable. Also, the obstination of the chief to build more and more Moai led to a neglection of agriculture and an over exploitation of trees as to build the statutes (Reynolds 1995). Furthermore, the elite put many taboos to stop the Short Ears from sharing it’s resources like imposing taboos on certain fish and food and don’t allowing them to grow corps. We notice here the prevalence of ceremonial life over economic life and the luck of any measures to save the economy. Thus, hungry and frustrated populations are doomed to revolt in order to survive.

Cosmology for the Rapa Nui chiefdom is Manichean, based on two deity ancestors, one incarnate the good and is called Ho To Ma Tua, and another incarnating the punishing spirit called Maki Maki. Cosmology and religion are more important than anything else in this population’s life, even the chief claims a relationship with the Gods. Ceremonial life is present in all the aspects of life: the purification of a bride, divination through bones and smokes, the bird Man competition (Reynolds 1995). Consequently, the priests class in highly estimated in the community and can use very harsh punishments to punish the ones who disobeyed the rules or violated the taboos. The building of the Moai is the most important activity in the Rapa Nui life as a veneration of their ancestors, but this causes mistrust among working Short Ears about the Gods.

The Rapa Nui people think that the world was submerged by the waters and that they were the only community alive kept by the Gods, so they lived for long in a complete isolation. Rapa Nui people live in a limited island, where they cannot expend of look for outside resources for survival. This isolation can be one explanation of why their chiefdom was fragmented instead of developing into a state like the Swazi, as they experiences no outside pressure of threat which pushed them to evolve.

As we saw the Rapa Nui chiefdom was fragmented into many small clans after the revolt of the frustrated Short Ears, because this community was socio-politically instable because of the ongoing competition over leadership, the neglection of economic work for achieving cosmological ceremonies and the geographical isolation of the Easter Island.

The Swazi chiefdom succeeded in building a state, while the Rapa Nui chiefdom failed and collapsed in mini-clans living in anarchy because of many reasons. Politically, the Swazi adopted a inclusive adaptative system, whereas the Rapa Nui were exclusive and discriminating. The Swazi politics were stable which enable the rise of the state, from their side the Rapa Nui lived in instability due to the competition over leadership. Economically, the Swazi paid attention to the redistribution of goods and to send immigrants in South Africa to work, while the Rapa Nui favoured ceremonial life over economic welfare crippled by their geographical isolation. Furthermore, from one hand the system of the Swazi was ruled by laws and religious habits, from the other hand, the Rapa Nui were ruled by taboos and class distinction in a rigid system. All these reasons, in addition to historical external reasons, made the Swazi turn into a State and drown the Rap Nui chiefdom into anarchy and fragmentation.

Reference list

-Benedict, A.R. (1991). Imagined communities : Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. London Print; New York.
-Kuper, H. (2002). The Swazi: A South African Kingdom. Thomson Custom Publishing. Stanford University.
-Reynolds, K. (1995). Rapa Nui. With Jason Scott Lee and Sandrine Holt. Warner Brothers Video.
-Wikipedia. www.wikipedia.com

Tribes are a form of groups which are united by a common Apical Ancestor, and who have complex kinship ties and feelings. Tribes economically rule their properties following a common group management model. Politically, tribes are egalitarian, so they have weak and shifting leaderships. Tribes are also strongly bounded to their customary traditional laws, and tend to see non-tribal people as inferior to them.

Since the rise of sovereign Nation States in tribal societies, the relationships between the state and the tribes have been very problematic, because of their different perspectives on laws and political organisation. Consequently, states tried to suppress, pacify or involve tribal people into new structures to guarantee their loyalties to the modern state. However, tribes continue to exist inside the states in many ways. Some tribes, married between traditional values and modern values, and continued existing in a hybrid form of organisation like the Native American Lakota tribes. Some other tribes officially don’t exist but remain very powerful locally and evolved in new modern forms like the Moroccan Arab and Berber tribes, whereas, some tribes still literally exist inside the Nation States, having a special status where they can enjoy a large autonomy, it is the case of the Pathans in Pakistan.

In this article, we will study how the tribes survived under the political and economic domination of the state, their forms of survival and the reasons why they rapidly adjust to outside pressures from modern states. We will use to analyse tribal survival three examples of tribes, which live under different situations, and which have undergone diverse kinds of pressures and ended in various kind of shapes: The Native American Lakota tribes of the United States, The Arab and Berber Tribes of the Kingdom of Morocco and the Pathan tribes of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.


The Example of the Lakota Tribes

The Lakota of the Rosebud are Native American Sioux hunter and warrior tribes, whose native language is the Lakota, and who were originally from the Missouri River and Rocky Mountains. “By 1800 [the Lakota] had a relatively fixed residence along with the White and Bad Rivers in present-day South Dakota, where they were seen by Lewis and Clark in 1804” (Grobsmith 2001, pp: 8). The Lakota are originally tribal people tied by kinship relationships and local laws applied by the Tribal Council. .Since 1851, the life of the Sioux tremendously changed because of the U.S government pressures and the signing of the Fort Lamarie Treaty, so the Lakota people became a dominated group living in limited reservations, designed by a number of treaties signed between 1868 and 1889 (Grobsmith 2001, pp: 11-13).

The U.S state didn’t consider the Lakota tribal existence as appropriate with its interests, so many wars and massacres against civilians and armed movements ended in the Sioux forced surrender and settlement inside limited areas, at the same time, the state tried to suppress tribal practices and impose its own vision of social and political organisation. The ruling state designed Peace Chiefs and gave them many privileges to negotiate with them about the community interests, but the tribal organisation rejects individual leadership, which means that these Peace Chief don’t represent the tribe members. The U.S state also imposed its language, religion, housing, property system and educational system on theses tribal people, who originally have different traditions regarding their organisation (Grobsmith 2001, pp: 18 – 36). In a tribal society, in which pride and honour plays and important role, the feeling of defeat led to a very painful depression translated by very high rates of alcoholism, unemployment and suicide among young people (Eyre 2002). The film Skins presents a very realistic image about the life in the reservation and how the state’s marginalisation of tribal values can badly influence tribally rooted communities. Life in the reservation and the low development rates makes the reservation like a third world ghetto, which does not follow the progress of the American state. We also notice that, the more the society is traditional and tribally based the more it is marginalised by the state. In one hand we see how the Antelope community got easily involved within the state system because it has adopted the health, schooling and housing system implanted by the U.S authorities, in the other hand, we have a more traditional community in Spring Creek, which has no important services because it is stuck on its original tribal values (Grobsmith 2001, pp: 37-45).

In spite of all what the American State does to suppress tribal loyalties and traditions to integrate Native American in the State system, some of the Lakota tribal heritage survived and even melt with the new aspects of life. “In reality, contemporary native culture is a blending of both traditional and modern elements. Today both reservation and urban Indians choose to retain certain features of their native culture while simultaneously adopting aspects of western life” (Grobsmith 2001, pp: IX). In fact, in nowadays’ reservations English is the language used in services and administrative procedures, but the Lakota is still used inside some families and especially in ceremonial practices like healing and death ceremonies (Eyre 2002). Among tribal values that survived, there is the strong kinship ties and the notion of “Tiyospy” or Our People presented by the American Indian Movement actions in favour of the Indian communities (Grobsmith 2001, pp: 107). We find this strong kinship ties also in the film Skins, represented by how family members support each other even if they are wrong, and by the symbolic actions done by Ruddy to take revenge following tribal laws because, even if he works with the state’s conventional law (The Police), for him it’s not enough to achieve justice (Eyre 2002). Furthermore, the religious aspects in the reservations are very relevant to study how the Natives associated Native and Christian believe spontaneously in their everyday’s religious practices. “…Elements of Christianity are becoming more acceptable within the context of native practices, just as elements of native religion are being brought deliberately into the church” (Grobsmith 2001, pp: 61). Missionaries also focused on similarities between Native and Christian believes like the idea of a Supreme Being (God / Wakan Tanka), sacrifice (Crucifixion / Sun Dance), religious healing and some prophecies. Thus, Natives have a Syncretistic believe where they go to the priest or to the holy man following their needs (Class discussions). Apart from these examples, there are few aspects of tribal life which still exist within the Lakota, as a result of the U.S state’s efforts to suppress their tribal system.

The Lakota tribes suffered very violent attempts by the state to make them adopt the Western Capitalist life style. Yet, many original tribal aspects survived like the Lakota language, religion and kinship ties, which give the modern Lakota people a Hybrid identity marrying traditional values to western value. Though, official figures about alcoholism, unemployment, suicide and domestic violence, may highlight the failure of the state to transform tribal Native people into a well-integrated productive citizens within the U.S state.

The Example of the Moroccan Tribes

Morocco is originally a tribal state, composed by original Berber tribes like Aït Atta and Zayan and incoming Arab tribes throughout the centuries like the Banu Ma’kil and Banu Hillal. Moroccan tribes, like oriental Arab tribes, have a strong believe on the tribal law called Al Urf, and are very bounded to tribal obligations like assistance, protection and providing resources. Leadership inside Moroccan tribes is a matter of consensus and can change very easily (Class discussions). Since the arrival of Mulay Idriss the political leadership was given to a “Cherif” King from the lineage of the Prophet Muhammad, to whom the tribes of the country swear allegiance in a ceremony called Al Bay’a, so that the consensus between the tribes is maintained. Yet, according to the laws of the modern Moroccan Kingdom, tribes don’t exist anymore, but in reality major political problems faced by Morocco are out of tribal issues and some tribes even evolved into modern shapes to cope with modern needs.

According to John Waterbury, in his book The Commander of the Faithful; the Moroccan Political Elite - a Study in Segmented Politics, Moroccan Sultans tried to get allied with one tribe against the others, so that they keep the tribes in a perpetual competition about who will get the alliance with the “Castle”. Waterbury, explains that this game of power was practiced even within the Moroccan modern state under the rule of Hassan II (Waterbury 1970, pp: 51).

Officially tribes don’t exist any more in Morocco, because they are supposed to be all citizens of the Nation State. Yet, in the Tafilalt region, which is a typically tribal area, for example, it is very interesting to notice how tribal aspects strongly survived. In this region, people are not impressed by strangers, because they still feel superior to non-tribal people. In addition to that, Cherifs, who claim to be direct descendents of the prophet, still constitute a privileged social and economic cast in Tafilalt. In this society, if a person comes from a lower cast, even if he achieves wealth he will remains seen as being inferior (Trip to Tafilalt). Regarding, the Moroccan post-colonial problems, it is noticeable that many political problems the Kingdom has faced and still facing are due to tribal issues. For Example, the Revolt or the Rif was due to the anger of Rifi tribes, which felt politically marginalised by political elite from Istiqlal Party. Moreover, the Western Sahara issue, which is a national priority for the Moroccan state, is a matter of tribal loyalty between the Alaoui Sultans and the Banu Hassan. In is also relevant to consider how the Sultans married from other tribes to assure their support even in modern times, like when Hassan II married from the Zayan Berber tribe (Dr. Shoup’s lecture). According to Waterbury, even the modern Moroccan political parties are nothing but a continuation of the tribal segmentary system where the elites fight to get privileges from the King (Waterbury 1970). We can also mention, the behaviour of the candidates during election times, which is typically tribal, as they invite people and hold ceremonies as a sign of their generosity like their tribal ancestors used to do, whereas, these practices are seen as bribery by the modern state.

Moroccan Arab and Berber tribes don’t exist officially, whereas they are still a major component of social and political life. Moroccan tribes are behind many major political issues that the kingdom still faces, which proves that the pacification policies initiated by the French and continued under the Moroccan rule has failed. Furthermore, the tribal mind even evolved in modern organisations and practises.

The Example of the Pathan Tribes

The Pathans are very strong tribes living in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Pathans in Pakistan live in the Northern part of the country in a special area where they have their complete political, social and economic autonomy, called the “Tribal Area”, inherited from the British colonisation that failed in dominating the Pathan tribes.

The Pathans are the concrete incarnation or an autonomous tribal entity living legally within a modern Nation State. The Pathans are beyond the government authority, as the state have to intervene only when there is a major tribal dispute with risks (Summer 1988). The Pathans have their own schools and other services, which go along with their structures. Pathans rely on Religion as if the attachment to Islam unites the tribe (Summer 1988). Social life is divided following religious status and knowledge. High status people are the men who are the descendent of the prophets, the elders who studies in Arabia or the ones who have a wide knowledge on religion, and the denigrated are the foreigners like the Russians or the British because they are seen as infidels. Consequently, Koran is the basis of education of young generations in traditional Pathan schools (Summer 1988). Besides Islam, the Pathan tribes rely on their tribal code called “Pukhtumwali”, which is a traditional law inherited from their ancestors, so they don’t believe in any case on the state’s laws. If a conflict accrues, the two parts go to consult the “Jirga”, which is a council of elders that gives bounding decisions that should be respected by the tribe’s members, as they have no other alternative or representatives in the parliament. Sometimes, according to the film, Jirga decisions can be applied to Pathan tribes even in another Nation State like Afghanistan (Summer 1988). As the rules are cross-borders, so is tribal solidarity. In the film we noticed a very strong discourse reminding of tribal obligations towards Afghan Pathan refugees, which is according to one of the speakers in the film “an Islamic, moral, tribal obligation” (Summer 1988). Economically, Pathans start to get more things from the government in exchange of mineral and jewellery exploitation, but still many Pathan villages are in a very miserable situation because of tribal constant fights and the common ownership of the land (Summer 1988).

Between the extremely Tribal Area and the Pakistani State, Swat has risen as a city combining between tradition and modernity. Swat was established around the mausoleum of a very important local Saint, and ruled by the noble Khans, who are supposed to rule the city in exchange of the support of the people. In Swat, land ownership is applied and government welfare services are available, so the city’s inhabitants enjoy a better socio-economic situation (Summer 1988).

The Pathan tribes in Northern Pakistan enjoy a special treatment by the state, as tribal valued are so deeply impregnated in them that the Pakistani state decided to give them their political and socio-economic autonomy. The authority of the tribes in that region goes beyond the Nation State’s boundaries, which may menace the existence of the State. Yet, some areas like Swat, succeeded in combining traditional and modern advantages to guarantee the wellbeing of its population, which proves the tribe and the state can cohabitate where economic interests are involved.

Conclusion

Since the apparition of the Nation State as a sovereign modern entity it has clashed with tribal groups in many areas of the world. In the case of Native American Lakota tribes, the bloody attempts of acculturation to assimilate the Native tribes with the western style American State, ended in a lose of political aspects of tribal life, whereas many cultural aspects where integrated to give the today’s Lakota people an Hybrid identity. Although, the frustration of tribal identity may explain the overwhelming images of depression in nowadays U.S native reservations. For the Moroccan tribes, officially tribes don’t exist any more, but in the Sultan’s political calculations the tribal aspects is always present, sometimes even disguised in modern institutions like political parties, according to Waterbury. The Pathans are a very special form of tribes, as they are organised as a state inside the state, with a cross-borders tribal loyalty web and a legally independent socio-economic and political status.

The weakness of the tribal leadership can explain the domination of the Lakota by the U.S state, whereas Moroccan tribes find a consensus under the persona of a Cherif King as the People from Swat under the rule of the Khans. Yet, he Pathans are still strong even if their leadership system is weak one, but maybe in the near future the Pathan tribes has to make a choice between the wellbeing of their people or the pride of their tribes.

Reference List:

- Eyre, C. (2002). Skins. With Graham Greene and Eric Schewing.
- Grobsmith, E.S. (2001). Lakota of the Rosebud: A Contemporary Ethnography. Stanford University. Thomsom custom publishing.
- Summer, A. (1988). The Pathans: Disappearing World. With Akhbar Ahmed, anthropologist. PBS.
- Waterbury, J. (1970). The Commander of the Faithful: The Moroccan Political Elite - A Study in Segmented Politics. Columbia University Press, New York.

The Mardu are Australian Aborigines who came 40 000 years ago from Asia and since then lived in total isolation in the Australian inner land desert where they developed a complex web of kinship relations and a hunter gatherer life style. The Mardu lived in harmony with the harsh desertic nature, as they believed in a Law provided by the spirits, which inspires them their social organisation, their taboos and ritual practices in a Dream living logic. However Mardu aborigines don’t have the notion of Progress in their culture, they only believe in change ordered by the spirits. By the beginning of the twentieth century Mardu aborigine where forced to get out of their isolation, as a new form of non-Mardu human beings came to live only 50 miles away from their homeland. After leaving the desert and settling in the community of Jigalong, the Mardu have been living under the Whitefella’s cultural, economic and political domination. Yet, the Mardu succeeded in maintaining to some extent their original Law’s integrity from the contact with the white Australians.

The Kwegu are a tribally organised population living next to the Omo River in southern Ethiopia. The Kwegu are considered being a second-class people in a society dominated by the pastoral Mursi and Bodi tribes. Even if the Kwegu are the first settlers on the Omo land, they still live as a culturally, economically and politically dominated group under the rules of the Mursi and Bodi tribes. The Kwegu don’t perceive them selves as dominated, as they are aware of their economic and social contribution to the society. Yet, the number of Kwegu is shrinking more every year because of the unfair social organisation and marriage restrictions.

The anthropologist David Turton, who studied the aspects of the Kwegu domination, suggests that the understanding of the Kwegu- Mursi- Bodi relationships can help in understanding how domination works in general. This article is a comparative paper of the cultural, economic and political aspects of dominations within the Kwegu and the Mardu societies, as to analyse whether Turton’s theory fits to all dominated groups or not.

Cultural Domination

The life of the Mardu, as described by Tonkinson, is “characterised by an extremely simple technology and material culture and an equally outstanding complex religious and cosmological system” (Tonkinson, 2002, pp: vi). Consequently, the cultural domination was more felt in the cultural aspects and means of daily life rather than in the religious and ceremonial ones, which remained preserved from any outside influence. Mardu Aborigines see White Anglo-Australians as belonging to an other category of creatures other than the human beings they were used to, so cultural curiosity played a major role in the physical abandonment of their homeland and migration next to the Withfella’s settlements (Tonkinson, 2002, pp: 160). The Mardu settlers in Jigalong are a cultural minority compared to the huge number of Anglo-Australians living next to them. As a result, it is obvious that the culture of the dominant group in terms of number will affect the minority groups. The Mardu, and especially the young generations, changed their diet, their clothing, marriage age and started learning English and going to health centres as well as schools, as to be assimilated socially and culturally to the dominant group. Yet, the kinship connections remained as important as before in the Jigalong camps. The Christian missionaries entered Jigalong by 1945, and as stated in the book “in its quarter century of life, the mission failed to become a viable concern evangelically or economically” (Tonkinson, 2002, pp: 163). This can be better explained regarding the strength of the cosmological believes and how it regulates the whole live of the Aborigines. The notion of progress it self is questioned here, because progress doesn’t exist in the Mardu believes, only changes can acquire, whereas Progress can only come from the dream spirits. Thus, clothing, language and other daily things can change but not the religious believes. I can say here, that maybe the Mardu are dominated by the esoteric world which prevented them from being dominated by the new masters of the esoteric world. It is quite a complex psychological kind of domination by their dream spirits.

In the case of the Kwegu-Mursi, the dominant and the dominated group can’t be culturally separated, as they lived together for several time and developed progressively their complex relationships. In the Kwegu society, unlike the Mardu, there is no non-human being other, there is only two interdependent parts of the same society. However, in this same society, the Kwegu are seen as second class people (Turton, 1989). The cultural and social domination by the Mursi can be noticed in all the aspects of daily life. For instance, the Kwegu houses lay out sparely in a form of a racial ghetto, so is the separation in terms of ceremonial practices and marriages (Turton, 1989). The Kwegu are bilingual because they have to master the language of the dominant group, whereas the Mursi only speak their own language, because they see the Kwegu tongue as being inferior and not worth learning (Turton, 1989). We noticed the same linguistic domination among the Mardu, who learn English to communicate with the Anglo-Australians. Another aspect of cultural domination is how the Mursi call the Kwegu. They often call them “those who don’t have” or “ours”, as if they were their property, the same thing was practised by the Australian government, which took long time before admitting that Aboriginals were human beings and citizens.

The aspects of cultural domination are the same regarding daily life’s relationships and social organisation, but contrary to the Kwegu who are losing their identity while shrinking in number, the Mardu have changed in their external looking and behaviour but kept the integrity of their kinship ties and especially their religious perception of the world.

Economic domination

Moving from the nomadic life in the desert toward a stable life in Jigalong implies the end of the hunting-gathering life and a huge upheaval in the economic life of Aborigines. The author explains “the link between increasing involvement and growing dependence on, an alien economy” (Tonkinson, 2002, pp: 162), which means that one of the highest prices for integration into the Anglo-Australians life style is to accept their economic domination. The Mardu, who became dependant of many services like teas and sugar, give in exchange sheep labour and Aboriginal prostitutes. After 1945, some Mardu started working also in pastoral leases owned by the missionaries (Tonkinson, 2002, pp: 163-164), but the Mardu men continue to return to Jigalong where their family and kids live, which helped in maintaining the kinship structure. Another main aspect of economic domination, is how the sedentarization transformed the Mardu economy into a cash-oriented economy (Tonkinson, 2002, pp: 166), which is very typical of the dominant group economic style. The Mardu workers were also marginalised in some economic activities like mining, even if it’s their land which has been exploited by the miners.

Economically, the Kwegu don’t see them selves as a dominated group, because they feel that they have a major role in the economic exchange with the Mursi and the Bodi (Turton, 1989). The Kwegu provide the canoes for the Mursi to cross the river to take care of their lands and do their trade, and without the Kwegu skills in canoe making and sailing the dominant group can be economically in danger. The Kwegu also work in all hand working as honey gathering of fixing rifles… In the other hand the Mursi are the land owners, and the ones who own cattle, which is the main distinction between the two groups. Thus, in this society hand workers are seen as second-class people, while the cattle owners are the noble people. In the marriage negotiations, every Kwegu is in need of a Mursi or Bodi patron to provide the bullets and cattle needed as dote for the bride (Turton, 1989).

In the Mardu society, the aboriginals are completely dominated within a new economical system very different from what they were used to. They had to let down all their hunting-gathering skills for new repellent activities to ensure their survival. In the other hand the Kwegu don’t feel dominated economically by their Mursi patrons, as they use their specialised skills to get the necessary help in order to get married.

Political Domination

Originally, the Mardu were totally disinterested in political life and bureaucratic procedures “which they perceived as legitimately “Whitefella business”… they were considered trivial in comparison to the central concern of the Mardu” (Tonkinson, 2002, pp: 164). Consequently, Mardu aborigines didn’t feel politically dominated, as they believe neither in political organisation nor in land ownership. They see the land as the property of the Dream Spirits, and dealing with political matters of being secondary compared to their concern with religious rituals. Since 1967, the Australian state has been discriminating the aboriginals, and even when it legislated the Self-determination law, it hasn’t taken into consideration that the Aboriginals were unprepared to elect representative agents to negotiate for them (Tonkinson, 2002, pp: 167-168). The political domination resulted in patriarchal governance elite, which pushed the Aboriginal women to ask for their political rights (Tonkinson, 2002, pp: 170). The Aboriginal land rights are still a big issue for the Australian government, which is still to some extent favouring the dominant group.

The Kwegu are considered politically like children having nothing to do with decision making. Even in their marriage the Kwegu need a patron to be able to have a wife. “The Kwegu have the choice in choosing their patron but must have one” (Turton, 1989), as they are seen as note able to rule them selves without a Mursi or Bodi patron. The Patrons provide physical protection for the Kwegu and play the role of a family guardian if he provides the cattle for the marriage.

The Mardu and the Kwegu are both politically dominated, but the Mardu have originally no concern with decision making because of being too busy with their religious lives, whereas the Kwegu remain minors all over their lives because their patrons take care of speaking on their names.

The Mardu Aborigines are culturally and socially dominated by Anglo-Australians in external aspects of life, while they kept their religious integrity, as they seem to be spiritually dominated by the Dream spirits. Yet, the Kwegu as a cultural group are totally dominated, and their culture is shrinking as they are being assimilated by the dominant group. Economically we see the Mardu suffering from the huge upheaval in their economical system from hunter-gatherers to field workers and prostitutes, whereas, the Kwegu feel comfortable in their economic exchange with the Mursi-Bodi, as being a part of a skilled class. Politically speaking both Mardu and Kwegu suffer from marginalisation, as the Mardu have no experience in political affairs and the Kwegu are still considered as minors. Consequently, we notice that Turton’s theory about generalising the aspects of domination prove to be very relative, because every dominated group has its particularities, so is the dominant group, and this chock between the values of both which creates the domination aspects.

Reference List

Woodhouse, L. (1989). The Kwegu: Disappearing World. With David Turton,
anthropologist. PBS.

Tonkinson, R. (2002). The Mardu Aborigines: Living the Dream in Australian’s desert.
Stanford University. Thomsom custom publishing.

Pre-islamic Moroccan Berber tribes were mostly Jewish with a few minorities of Christians. It was very difficult to impose Islam on these tribes, and the fights took many centuries before Islam was completely settled in this land. Popular culture in Morocco believes that if the tribes were ruled by Cherifs (I mean people from the tree of the Prophet Mohamed a.s) the land would be fertile, as they carry a sort of Baraka (Blessing) wherever they go. These tribes start welcoming Alaouits who were escaping from the Umayyad and the Abbasids and making them the kings of Morocco. The first king of Morocco was Molay Idriss. He is a Hassanit who escaped from the Khilafa of the East and established his kingdom here. Molay Idriss married the daughter of the chief of the Berbers, as a symbol of blood alliance between the two. Since then, all the Moroccan dynasties are from Ali & Fatima, because only an Alaouit can unite the multiple conflictual Moroccan tribes & the incoming Arab tribes fleeing drought and political injustice as well as the Jewish & Arab communities who escaped from Andalusia throughout the centuries. Nowadays, our ruling King Mohammed V is him-self an Alaouit & an offspring of Hassan a.s. And believe it or not, The king still carrys that symbolic charisma of a Cherif.

However, due to the social particularities of Berber tribes and to the mixture that forms the Moroccan society, the Kings of Morocco many centuries ago have chosen to adopt Sunna as religious doctrine instead of Shia. Yet, they have chosen a very clever Sunna doctrine, as they married the doctrine of Malik Bnu Anass to the philosophy of Ashaari and to the Sufism of Junayd. Consequently, Morocco have kept many of its Shia roots and symbols and at the same time satisfied the needs of the street people (Al Jamaa), by adopting a Sunni Maliki Ashaari Junaydi approach of Islam. With my little experience of Moroccan Sufism, and the studies I did on the subject, I may conclude that Sufism in Morocco was developed as a sect which practices secret Shiism with a limited number of adepts, whereas the majority of people continued to practice a Sunni style Islam.

After Khomeini’s revolution in Iran in 1979, security measures were taken to stop the spread of such an ideology among young Moroccans in universities and Islamic parties. But in the 1996 Moroccan reformed Constitution, it was mentioned that Morocco is an Islamic country without focusing on the Maliki doctrine as it was the case before. This means that being Shia in Morocco is not against the Constitution, as long as it’s an individual practice not a political stream!

Anyway, Moroccan Shia today are a bunch of intellectuals, not more that 50 persons. Most of them received their education in Lebanon or Iraq or were influenced by the writings of the French thinker Henry Corbin or of Khomeini’s Political Islam’s ideology. Moroccan Shia are mostly located in Rabat, Marrakech, Fez and Northern Regions, but they have no spiritual leader (Marji Ataklid). They follow Iraqian or Iranian Spiritual guides most of the time, as I deduced from my discussion with many of them.

According to my sources, Moroccan Shia tempted to organise them-selves in a regular theopolitical movement during a meeting in Tanger. However, they had different interests and perspectives about that movement so it failed. But obviously, many members of some new Islamic Parties are Shia like Al Badil Al Hadari, and many educational and cultural associations are funded by Shia in Morocco like Al Ghadir association in Meknes and many others in the North.

During the celebration of the sad memory Ashurae in Morocco, we notice the persistence of many ancient symbols taken from both Shia and Jewish traditions. Moroccans fast during Ashurae and they bay dolls and games for children to stop them from crying the death of Hussein a.s. In some regions they even settle places for the ceremony of Azae. These are somehow Shia traditions. Yet, these symbols are mixed with others, borrowed from the Jewish celebration called Haylula, like lighting a big fire in each street and turning around it while playing on some leather instruments and using this fire for black magic.

When I saw Moroccan people crying Saddam’s death and accusing Shia in Iraq of being the allies of American forces, I feel a sort of bitterness inside. These people unfortunately ignore everything of their Shia religious identity, and Islamic education in the Moroccan educational system as well as media; don’t help at all in informing them about the subject. But when I see the support Moroccans owe to Hezbollah or Iran, I think that the traces of their Shia past can’t be erased by the wind of Sunna centuries.

I still need to clarify one more thing. Moroccan religious identity as I see it today is changing in a tremendous way towards a non-doctrinal sort of Islam. This is due to many reasons like: The huge luck in education, weakness of national media, the chock of modernity and the fragilazing hits it’s experiencing : Extremism, New Sufism trends (Adl Wa Lihsaan & Tarika Boutchichia) and Christian Missionaries… My personal prediction about the future evolution of the Moroccan religious identity is that; if Shia elite can emerge in this sensitive & particular moment of Moroccan history, the Shia doctrine can be resurrected as a major religious identity in Morocco.

[Stars are not only nice spots of light which decorate heaven, it's also a secret map written in the dark mysterious skies to guide some blessed people to absolute wisdom. This text has been taken from a letter I wrote to one of my best friends]

Let me explain to you how I see life in the language of stars. A star is a very shiny & lovely creature made of pure energy. When a star dies there are three kinds of death that may happen to it. It can die and become a Cold Star, just a big rock passive with no activity or energy. For me Cold Stars are like human beings who choose to live passive and die passive. Second way a star can die is by becoming a Black Hole out of time and space, eating every thing that passes by and destroying other celestial creatures. This kind of stars is like people who live by destroying the life of other people, they make others suffer to hide their own sufferance. The third kind of death a star can end in is what we call a Supernova. A Supernova is a huge explosion of a star it's very beautiful, and by exploding the parts of the dead star start turning in a regular Orbit and form a new little stars and planets where life can appear. Our Solar System is a result of a big Supernova. It means that with its death, a star can give birth to new things. In my opinion, Sohrawardi, Ibnu Sina, Descartes, Shakespeare and many others, were all stars which ended as Supernovas, as their ideas never died and gave birth to eternal masterpieces. I want to end my life as a proud star in a huge Supernova, and leave a good part of me to future generations when will say goodbye to this life... Inshaallah I’ll do!

When I was a little girl I used to watch that big shiny twinkling star, the Polar Star. I looked around me but can find nobody who matches its perfection. Jean Paul Sartre, Camus, cartoon heroes, school teachers... None of them deserves my admiration like my Polar Star, which is the incarnation of perfection from a creature perspective; calm, wise, high, proud, burning with energy, illuminating the sky with its amazing beauty... So I want to because like my star. When I’ve grown up, I discovered that humans can't touch stars. That most humans are too busy with material things that they forget to look at the stars and learn from its wisdom. I also discovered that because of the distance maybe my star is already dead, and that the spot of light I perceive in the dark is just the light of it which travelled throughout heavens to feed my dreams. Yet, I'll never lose hope and still plan to go to that star which once guided sailors to the north. Dead or alive, my star taught me many lessons in life. It didn't guide me to geographical North, but to the North of spiritual geography of souls.

[This is a joined article written by Adele from Tufts University & me representing Al Akhawayn University within the Soliya Program for connecting future global leaders.]


Education is the most important mean of shaping the identity and impregnating a certain community of the values of its cultural system. As the aim behind the Soliya program is implementing a better mutual understanding between the American and and Arab societies, we’ve chosen to present throughout this common work a comparative overview of the American and the Moroccan universities’ educational systems, as institutions of elite production. We will approach this very sensitive subject by dividing the work in two parts, one dealing with the American model and the other with the Moroccan one. In each part we’ll be focusing on tree levels of description: the universities’ infrastructures, the educational pedagogy and the educational content.

I.The United States Universities Educational System

The University education system in the United States began in 1636 with the founding of Harvard University in Cambridge MA, and has since grown to close to 300 Universities. Universities in the U.S. for many years were primarily for privileged white men from elite families. Because of the limited educational opportunities for women, colleges solely for women began to develop in 19th century America. While these women’s colleges continue to prosper, beginning in the mid-20th century those universities reserved only for men started opening their doors for women. Currently in the U.S. there are still a small number of women’s colleges but by and large the majority of the United States Universities are available to anyone regardless of sex. Presently applicants are judged based on essays, teacher recommendations, a transcript, extra-circular activities, and finally College Board admission exam scores. Based on these attributes and sometimes an interview universities accept members into there student body. Overall these University students live on or near campus away from home and study as a student full time.

The United States undergraduate education system is primarily divided into two types of institutions based on there sources of funding. In the United States, with the exception of military service academies, there are no universities directly regulated by the federal government. Instead they government gives money and assistance to universities and it is the state governments that are more involved in the management of public universities. These public universities which receive funding from both the state and local governments systems and that cost less to attend. There are also private universities and colleges who are managed independently of the government and receive minimal state funding. In the United States some of the private universities are religiously affiliated but the role religion has in education varies enormously. In some institutions religion is large part of the education and in others it is simply affiliated and has minimal influence over the curriculum.

There are several types of pedagogy in the United States education system that are used to varying degrees in most universities. First there are large lecture classes in which enrollment can be as many as a few hundred students. In this environment the professor teaches the lector class while the Teaching Assistants run smaller recitations, labs and review sessions. Smaller types of class are seminars which have less then 20 people, there are often no Teaching Assistants and these are the most intimate between professors and students. Often with smaller classes the course is based more on discussion and writing then are larger classes focused on professor lectures. There are also medium sized classes that incorporate some discussion and lecture to try to find a balance between the two extremes. The variety of classes available allows students to find classes that fit them the best offering the most options for success.

The University System in the United States offers a wide range of educational opportunities. In terms of content there are technical schools that teach there students the necessary skills for being successful in specific jobs immediately after graduation. However that is not the norm. Typically Universities require students to study a core curriculum designed to ensure a basis of knowledge and breadth of curriculum for all students. After that, students pick a major or concentration which allows them to focus on a specific topic or field that interests them. This major or concentration is sometimes a direct preparation for work after graduation and in other cases it may have little relevance on what careers a student chooses to pursue.

II.The Moroccan Universities Educational System

Morocco is originally a tribal archaic society, where knowledge is considered as a priceless capital. Because of that, the religious doctors who can read and write constituted a powerful class with whom all the monarchies of the kingdom tried to ally themselves in order to contain and influence the street people. Morocco has the oldest university in the world; Al-Qarawiyin University founded in 859 by Fatima Feheria, a wealthy woman who came to Morocco from the East. This religious style university, which still exists today, was offering a range of fields of specialization among the most important of that period. The university also had a campus where students can eat and sleep & a huge library as well as financial independence. Nowadays, there are three different kinds of higher education institutions in the Moroccan educational model. First, there is a traditional religious family of institutions which still subsist to form the specialists in Islamic affairs. These institutions are very firm and produce a narrow-minded minority. Second, there are the specialized institutions, which attract the best students to study different fields like engineering, journalism and management. This kind of institution is the legacy of the French style education left by the colonization period. Then there are the universities which constitutes a network of 13 public free universities, situated in the most important cities of the country, unfortunately these universities are very weak & poor academically because of there dependence on the state and ministry of education. Finally, there is an American style very modern university dedicated for the upper classes and the elite of the society, which is Al Akhawayn University. In addition to these forms there are many private institutions, but which have no apparent impact in shaping the cultural identity of the elites. According to the official figures, the different Moroccan universities produces 24000 new graduated student every year, on a population of 30 million, for 2500 teachers, and more than 19% of the country’s general budget.

In terms of pedagogy, the Moroccan universities face different kind of problems. A mixture of the religious rigid system and the French inflexible model influenced the perception of education in Morocco till the late 1990s, when King Hassan II called for a general reform of education and constituted The Special Commission of Education and Formation. Another problem, is the luck of interactivity between the teachers and the students, which creates passive submissive & frustrated individuals roughly able to think and produce ideas. Furthermore, teachers receive very few training on the techniques of pedagogy and andragogy, which makes them not ready to face young generations. As a result of these reasons and many others, Moroccan universities produce young people with no practical experience and no courage to face the harsh market of work, so many of them remain jobless and start thinking of immigrating legally or illegally abroad.

As far as educational content is concerned, it is important to mention that the ideological turmoil Morocco was living during the 1970s in the universities pushed the leader parties to shut philosophy courses and replace them by religion courses. This huge mistake in the history of Moroccan’s education system succeeded in calming the communist voices but in exchange offered an excellent cradle for extremists and crippled the regenerations of the elites during the 1980s and 1990s. Among the other characteristics of the educational content, is the focus on the theoretical aspects not the practical ones of knowledge, and a narrow perception of the world presenting sometimes the others as evil, which is very contradictory to the Moroccan culture, which is labeled as being tolerance.

Moroccans have a good reputation of being very brilliant in languages and new technologies, yet, this is mainly due to the human natural potential not the educational system which still needs to reform itself to cope with the needs of the global world. Unfortunately, this genuine luck in this crucial field push more and more Moroccans to chose to finish there education abroad, and most of the time never come back to Mother Land.

Sources:

-Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching: http://www.carnegiefoundation.org/
-Harvard University: www.harvard.edu
-Learning in Morocco: www.cp-pc.ca/english/morocco/learning
-The Higher Education Field official web site: www.enssup.gov.ma
-The Moroccan Ministry of Education official web site: www.men.gov.ma/
-The Special Commission for Education & Formation official web site: www.cofef.co.ma
-Tufts Office of Admissions http://www.tufts.edu/home/admissions/

A crying Shiit iraqian woman after voting for the constitution.
(A Reuters Picture)

Far from being a post-Cold War Nostradamus prophesising for a global apocalyptic Armageddon on religious and doctrinal basis, Samuel Huntington is a very serious scholar from Harvard University who formulated one of the most controversial post-Cold War theories about the New World Order. The Clash of Civilisations theory says that within the new world order conflicts will occur between religious and cultural civilisations not between traditional ideological nation-states. Huntington’s thesis has proven to be wrong in many of its claims. Yet, it may be very relevant to explain some contemporary global issues.

In this paper, I would try to give a general overview of Huntington’s theory and multiple streams that have influenced it. Then, I would try to analyse different aspects of this theory based on nowadays’ global events, to demonstrate how they could be relevant or not to the future world order.

Samuel Phillips Huntington was born in 1927. He graduated from Yale at the age of 18, and had his PhD at the age of 23 from Harvard, where he still teaches Political Science. Huntington was first known during the 1960s for his researches on Coups d’état, Party System and Political Order, which he combined in his very well known book Political Order in Changing societies. His tough state-centred recommendations, made him hated by the 1960s liberal movements and the adviser of some Latin American transitional dictatorships like Brazil. During the post-Cold War period, Huntington elaborated his theory on The Clash of Civilisations, as the form of the 21st century global conflicts. Recently, another Huntington theory was subjected to controversy, as he argued that American identity is threatened by the huge numbers of Latin migrants, which can lead to an internal clash of civilisations and to a shift in the American identity.

In 1993 Samuel Huntington first published an article in the academic journal Foreign Policy an article entitled “The Clash Of Civilisations”, where he wrote “It is my hypothesis that the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. Nation states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations. The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future.”(Huntington 1993). This thesis generated a wide academic controversy, which pushed the Harvard Professor to explain his theory in depth in 1996 in his book The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order.

To understand The Clash of Civilisations theory, we should put it into its historical setting of the end of the Cold War, and the beginning of the 1990s Globalized world era. After its publication, Huntington’s article was seen as the encounter of Francis Fukuyama’s theory in 1989 on The End of History. Fukuyama’s theory which he explains by saying, "What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of post-war history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government." (Fukuyama 1989). Huntington’s theory challenges Fukuyama’s Global Liberalism theory by demonstrating that the western model won the ideological war but not the civilisational one.

In fact, Huntington’s theory based on fear of the Western civilization’s collapse and the Muslims and Sinic civilization’s rise, has been deeply influenced by many other thesis of that period. The term Clash of Civilizations was first used Bernard Lewis in 1990 in a research article called The Roots of Muslim Rage, where Lewis warns from Islamic fundamentalism. In addition to that, we can notice Huntington’s influence by Oswald Spangler’s theory on Western civilization’s fall because of the rivalry of other strong civilizations on the international scene. Some critics also see the influence of British scholar A.J Toynbee’s division of civilizations on Huntington’s work.

While preparing for this paper, I discovered with astonishment that the Moroccan visionary Mehdi El Manjra from Rabat University preceded Samuel Huntington in elaborating the theory of The Clash of Civilizations. El Manjra wrote in August 1991 after the first Gulf War in his book in Arabic The First Civilisational War “The Gulf War is only the first episode of a North-South conflict, which will be dominated now on by cultural considerations [translation mine]” (El Manjra 1991). It is also amazing to notice that El Manjra focuses on the same issues Samuel Huntington pointed out, which are as explained by El Manjra “The three main fears by the West are; The Fear of Demography, The Fear of Islam and The Fear of Asia [translation mine].”(El Manjra 1991). However, El Manjra’s work differs from Huntington in a way that the Moroccan advisor of the Japanese Emperor sees the possibility of peaceful interaction between different civilisations.

According to the book The Clash of Civilization and the Remaking of World Order, the world is divided into major civilisations on ethnic, cultural and religious criteria. Even if Huntington used many ethnological and historical studies to establish these divisions, it may still seem very ambiguous in some specific regions. The work came out with the following civilisations:

- The Western civilization, including North America, Europe, Australia…
- The Orthodox civilization, including Russia, Slavic countries and Eastern Europe.
- The Latin American civilization.
- The Muslim Civilization, including the Middle East, North Africa, Central Asia, Malaysia, South Asia and Indonesia.
- The Hindu civilization, including India and Nepal.
- The Sinic civilization, including China, Korea, Vietnam, Singapore, Taiwan…
- The Sub-Saharan African civilization.
- Other hybrid countries like Japan or Lone countries like Israel and Haiti… (Huntington 1996)

Further more, Huntington explains the dynamics of relations between these civilisations and which are more challenging than the others. According to Huntington, the Sinic civilization is growing faster than the others economically and demographically, which constitutes a threat to the Western civilization. Especially that there is huge number of Sinic migrants installed in the West. In addition to luck of real hegemony in the Asian region, which will facilitate the task for China to dominate the whole region. The second potential challenger of the West according to the author is the Islamic civilization or what he calls “the Islamic Resurgence”, which has a strong young population and well impregnated cultural values that could clash with the West. For Huntington, Christianity which is the basis of the Western civilization and Islam are Missionary religions looking to expend its followers, which stimulates fundamentalism and hatred between the two blocks. The scholar even describes Islam as having “bloody borders” in his original article, in reference to the Islamic expansionism throughout Spain and Eastern Europe. However, what the American Political scientist fears the most is potential alliances between two big civilisations like the Sinic and the Islamic civilization to clash with Western values imposed on the world, or the alliance between the Islamic and the Orthodox civilization against the West…

After 9/11 events which chocked the West, Samuel Huntington’s theory gained widespread attention again, as he declared to the press “Clearly, Osama bin Laden wants it to be a clash of civilisations between Islam and the West. The first priority for our government is to try to prevent it from becoming one. But there is a danger it could move in that direction. The administration has acted exactly the right way in attempting to rally support among Muslim governments. But there are pressures here in the US to attack other terrorist groups and states that support terrorist groups. And that, it seems to me, could broaden it into a clash of civilisations.”(The Guardian 2001). The events that followed 9/11 (Iraq War, Madrid bombing, Iranian Nuclear issue…) were all considered as being the signs of achievement of Huntington’s prophecy about the clash between Western and Islamic civilisations. But in this case the Crusades were a Clash of Civilisations with all the war before Westphalia. From an other point of view, it is legitimate to ask to what extent can transnational terrorist groups or isolated militias be representative of the whole Islamic civilization, to be able to judge about are we clashing or not.

Paul Berman in Terror and Liberalism argues that, in nowadays global world there is no more distinct cultural boundaries between civilisations. We may agree with Berman that the information revolution and the cross-borders interactions are huge between civilisations, but within this interaction there is a dominant Western culture which rule over the initial cultures that may revolt under the pressure. And as Huntington says "The West won the world not by the superiority of its ideas or values or religion but rather by its superiority in applying organized violence. Westerners often forget this fact, non-Westerners never do."(Huntington 1996), as he explains in his theory that the West should forget about “democratic universalism” and “incessant interventionism”, because the United Nations model and Human Rights clauses are the fruit of the Western mind not of the growing challenging cultures, which will ask for reforms sooner or later, even if Modernization, in some exceptions worked very well like in East Asian Tigers or in Japan, as can explain Mehdi El Manjra.

The Arabic thinker and Columbia University Professor Edward Said “The Clash of Civilizations thesis is a gimmick like The War of the Worlds, better for reinforcing defensive self-pride than for critical understanding of the bewildering interdependence of our time.” (Said 2001). What Edward Said means is that Huntington’s theory is nothing but an academic framework to justify the United States interventions against China and the Islamic World, or to keep Said’s words in his long answer to Huntington’s theory entitled The Clash of Ignorance” An imagined Geography to legitimate certain policies”. Said also highlights the effect of cultural Interdependence between civilisations, which fits into Joseph S. Nye Complex Interdependence theory, who describe Huntington’s vision as “suffer[ing] from trying to fit the post-Cold War world into one or other pattern. But one size does not fit all… not only are there multiple cultures, but there are very different types of states in terms of economic modernization” (Nye 2005). In fact, Nye points out a very important weakness of Huntington’s theory, which is the internal tensions and conflicts between the same civilization. Since the civilisational new actors can’t get rid of the legacy of the Nation-States, these components of one civilization will struggle within the same system. And even inside one state there are still heterogeneous identities; this is maybe what made Huntington turn to analyze the impact of internal clashes in his new work about migrant societies in United States.


The Clash of Civilization’s theory has many weaknesses in perceiving the dynamic movement of identity within one civilization and between one civilization and an other. Yet, it offered an important framework, which revealed how much a unipolar universalism can stimulate cultural hatred and so civilisational clashes. Some persons around the world like, former Iranian President Mohamed Khatami or Un Secretary General Kofi Anan already have understood the importance of the initiation of a real Dialogue between Civilisations and created the Alliance of Civilisations’ initiative, for a better understanding of the others.

REFERENCE LIST

-El Manjra, Mahdi. 1991. La première guerre civilisationelle, ed. Oyoun. Casablanca: 27-218.
-Fukuyama, Francis. 1989. The end of history. The National Interest. Summer:2-19.
-Huntington, Samuel. 1993. The clash of civilisations. Foreign affairs. Summer:21-45.
-Huntington, Samuel. 1996. The clash of civilisation and the remaking of world order, ed. -Simon & Shuster. New York.
-Huntington, Samuel. 2001. Civilisations at war. Interview in The Guardian. October, 21.
-Nye, Joseph S. 2005. Understanding international conflict, ed. Longman Classics in Political Science: 242-252.
-Said, Edward. 2001. The clash of ignorance. The National Interest. Fall:1-5.
-Wikipedia. On-line Encyclopaedia.

The Atlas Mountains in Greek Mythology were described as ‘the end of the world’, a far place where never-ending thunders and lightening strike all time long. This frightening image of the north western Africa can be still true because of the perpetual crisis between the two Powers in the Maghreb, the two brother enemies: Morocco and Algeria. What is ironic is that the etymology of the world Atlas seems to mean ‘to uphold’ or ‘to support’ according to Wikipedia On-Line Encyclopedia, but since their independence on 1956 for Morocco & 1962 for Algeria, the two neighbors did everything but support each other.

So why is the atmosphere so tense between Morocco & Algeria? Let’s ask the question to King Hassan, the Moroccan sovereign and its foreign policy architect, trough Eric Laurent who had the opportunity to hear him answer that “…Algerians had reasons to fear Morocco, & Morocco had its reasons to consider Algerians as the pure and simple heirs of colonialism [translation mine]”(Hassan II 1993, 44).

The truth is that the reality of such a conflict transcend the simple fact of two countries seeking to build their Nation-States within the post-colonial world. The apprehensive relationship in fact can best be explained by a combination of territorial boundaries, ideological boundaries, economical boundaries and especially psychological boundaries which separate the Moroccan country and the Algerian one.

In this paper I would try to analyze four main explanations of the Moroccan Algerian difficult relations since their independence, which are: the territorial problems, the ideological differences, the economic differences and the psychological complexes.


THE TERRITORIAL PROBLEMS

Historically, major parts of the today’s Algeria were parts of the Cherifian Empire till the beginning of the Franco-Spanish colonization of North Western Africa. After Morocco’s independence France offered to solve the amputated territories matter, but King Mohamed V refused and suggested to wait until the full independence of his neighbor.

After its independence on 1962, Algeria followed, according to Abdallah Laroui, “a schizophrenic logic” (Laroui 1976, 82), and consciously forgot about what Morocco’s Monarch did by calling to maintain the colonial boundaries, that’s how the territorial boundaries rose as a source of conflict between the two states.

The Istiqlal party’s leader Allal El Fassi increased the Algerian worries, when he came out with his Greater Morocco’s Project, and established a map which includes huge parts of Algeria (Bechar, Touat & Tindouf) as well as parts of Mali & the whole Mauritanian state (Hodges 1983,86).

The territorial boundaries’ conflict exploded in the 1963 war. Afterwards, “a committee of O.A.U studied the problem to let it cool down, and in 1972 the two neighbors signed an agreement delimiting and providing the demarcation of a boundary”(Zartman 2001, 210), but the explicit Algerian support of the S.A.D.R pushed King Hassan to play the territorial boundaries’ card to blackmail Abdelkader’s sons, by arguing that Rabat Agreement was not permanent. Consequently, King Hassan II“came to consider Algeria the major enemy of Morocco throughout his life”(Zartman 2001, 210).

This leads us to the second and most important territorial issue between the two countries, which is the Western Sahara. The U.N Resolution number 2229 released on 1966, claimed Algeria as “concerned part” (Zouitni 1997, 325) in the Sahara Conflict. In fact, Algeria has been playing an important role in the Sahara Conflict since the 1970s as a strategy to contain Morocco’s territorial expansion, which threatens the Algerian leadership over North Africa. As “the Kingdom territory will increase by nearly 60 percent, from 172.000 square mile to about 275.000 square miles”(Damis 985, 139). Therefore, Algerians adopted a regular discourse in its foreign policy about the Western Sahara subject, where they call for The Right of Nations to Self-Determination, which “made it clear to King Hassan, that they would not tolerate a Moroccan fait accompli in Western Sahara”(Dunbar 2000, 157).

But the territorial boundaries that separate Morocco from Algeria are just one cause among many others which explain the difficult relationships between the two countries and which may be solved by new leaderships. Especially that Morocco has a new Monarch who has a different perception, and who is not obliged to fellow his father’s governing style.


THE IDEOLOGICAL DIFFERENCES


Many scholars and experts argue that the Moroccan Algerian conflict is mainly due to the ideological boundaries that separate the two neighbors since their independence. During the Cold War, both countries appeared as being Satellites in the East-West race for ideological domination over the world.

Algeria and its other neighbor, the revolutionary Libya stood for the Eastern front in North Africa against a Morocco allied to the West . The Cherifian Kingdom used the situation to get political & financial support, so “he appealed to his fellow monarchs in the Arabian peninsula to support Morocco in it’s battle with socialist and revolutionary Algeria”(Damis 2000, 29). From the other side, he asked for armament supplies from both of
France and U.S, claiming that “because of the Soviet arms employed by the Polisario…Morocco was actually fighting the Soviet Union” (Damis 2000, 29). So Morocco benefited for a while from Saudian Money and U.S armament.

Also ideological differences may have been the cause behind personal antipathies among the Maghribi leadership, especially between Colonel Kadafi and King Hassan II, who was pointed by the first as a “Feudal pro-western monarch in a age of revolutionary Arab socialism”(Damis 1985, 145).

Morocco which is a kingdom that “grow as more tribes swore allegiance to the sultan” (Finan 2002, 5), has chosen a more liberal economy and a plural political field whereas Algeria has taken the revolutionary unique party path (Damis 1985, 144), but things are not as clear as they seem. The Morocco of the 1960s and 1970s if far from being a real democratic liberal country. And Algeria’s “90 percent Soviet origin arms” (Damis 1985, 148) does not mean Algeria’s definitive alienation to the East.

In 1978, the Camp David Accords, proved how much ideological orientation are fragile compared to the state’s interests. After the Cold War’s end and the late Algerian and Libyan cooperation with the West, there is no apparent excuses anymore for any ideological boundaries that separate Morocco from Algeria.


THE ECONOMIC PROBLEMS


Economic interests played an important role in the Morocco-Algerian conflict. “Owing to its oil and gas deposits, Algeria since independence has had a per-capita G.N.P of at least twice that of Morocco” (Zartman 2001, 209). Whereas Morocco is the fist phosphate producer in the world and have a prosper agriculture, but still relays on its importations of energy supplies.

But “maintaining military superiority over Morocco… contributed significantly to the economic problems… that Algeria is currently facing”(Dunbar 2000, 154). Also the Moroccan bill spent on armament and the conflict zone’s development is very high.

According to Laroui, Algerian aims to get a coastal opening into the Atlantic is not sensible, because a simple Moroccan Algerian cooperation can be held to allow Algeria to export it’s gas and oil trough Northern and Southern Morocco(Laroui 1976, 89).

As Europe’s salvation came from the United States, maybe the Maghreb’s salvation too can come from the Uncle Sam’s plans, thus the Eizenstat Initiative may heal the Maghreb’s years of difficult relations and may unite them on economic and strategic basis. So the
Economical boundaries won’t be a relevant cause of the Moroccan Algerian conflict anymore.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL COMPLEXES


The main reason of the Moroccan Algerian conflict may be deeper than territorial, ideological or economical interests; it may go back to the far history of each country. From one side, Morocco as the only real pre-colonial entity of the region which were once covering today’s Algeria, Mauritania, Mali & Senegal. From the other side, Algeria that was a
Moroccan territory then a Ottoman territory before being for more than a century a French colony governed by direct ruling. So we wonder if there is not a form of psychological boundaries which separate the two states, and if it is not one of the main reasons behind the whole Moroccan Algerian issue.

Yahia Zoubair says that “Moroccans display a superiority complex vis-à-vis Algerians, arguing that they have a long history of state and nation that Algerians do not have” (Zoubir 2000, 70). This can explain the Moroccan people’s support of the Great Morocco’s idea and even their volunteering for the Green March.

The fictive writing of Edward Moha explains how Algeria trays to compensate it’s historical complex by supporting a country she “created out of sand” (Moha 1984, 11) to contain it’s neighbor’s geopolitical domination over North Africa. But the populations’ psychology studies are quite inexistent concerning the Moroccan and the Algerian citizens or the political rulers’ political behaviors.

Kant explained in his Physical Geography, that “physical geography determines political geography”. In the Moroccan Algerian case, I’ll say that it’s the psychological geography which determines the political geography. Yet, to survive within the New World Order impregnated by regionalism, both Morocco and Algeria may open a new page, by adopting economical functionalism like Europe, which will solve gradually their political conflicts.

REFERENCE LIST

Demis, John. 1987. The impact of the Saharian dispute on Moroccan foreign policy. In
Domestic Policy, ed. Zartman. New York: Preager.
-----------. 2000. King Hassan and the Western Sahara. The Maghreb Review 25:1-2.
Dunbar, Charles. 2000. Saharan statis. Middle East Journal 4 (Fall).
Finan, Khadija Mohcine. 2002. The western Sahara dispute and the UN pressure.
Mediterranean Politics 7:2.
Hassan II. 1976. Le défi. In mémoires, ed. Albin Michel, 12-40. Paris.
-----------. 1993. La mémoire d’un roi. Entretiens avec Eric Laurent, ed. Plon, 44-48. Paris.
Hodges, Tony. 1987. The greater Morocco. In Western Sahara, ed. Lawrence Hill & Co.
Westport.
Laroui, Abdellah. 1976. L’Algérie et le Sahara Marocain. ed. Serrar, 81-95. Casablanca.
Marks, Thomas. 1990. Spanish Sahara – background to conflict. African Affairs 28 (March-
April), no. 2. Database on-line. Available from (www.jstor.org).
Moha, Edward. 1984. Mercenaire d’un pays imaginaire. ed. Albatros, 1-17. Paris.
Mortimer, Robert. 1993. Regionalism & geopolitics in the Maghreb. Middle East Report
(September-October), 184:16-19.Database on-line. Available from (www.jstor.org).
Wikipedia. Online Free Encyclopedia. Available from (www.wikipedia.org).
Yata, Ali. 1982. Le Sahara Occidental Marocain à travers les textes. ed. Al Bayane, 287-295.
Rabat.
Zartman, William. 2001. Morocco. In Diplomacy in the Middle East, ed. L.Carl Brown.
London: I.B.Tauris.
Zoubir, Yahia. 1976. Western Sahara conflict impedes Maghrib unity. Middle East Report
298 (January), 75:3-13. Database on line. Available from (www.jstor.org).
----------. 1998a. Algerian-Moroccan relations and their impact on Maghribi integration. The
Journal of North African Studies 5, no.1 (Spring).
----------. 1998b. Western Sahara: political economy of a conflict. ed, Ayachi . Westport:
Peager.
Zouitni, Hammad. 1997. Les intérêts nationaux entre la pratique politique extérieure du
Maroc et les besoins d’une redéfinition par rapport au nouveau système international.
In Rapport Annuel sur l’évolution du system international. Rabat

Despite its being the widest country of the black continent, crossed by the biggest river of the world The Nil and enjoying a rich amount of mineral resources especially oil and gold, Sudan remain one of the hot spots of the world because of a bad distribution of resources among the diverse components of the Sudanese body which damages the unity of the regions and menace many of its close neighbors. After the Mehdi’s putsch, the South crisis and many bloody episodes, now is the turn of Darfur to explode in peaces, while the international public opinion and the media are busy following every helicopter sound in Iraq and every single word pronounced by Ahmadi Najad. Whereas, millions of citizens from Darfur and the Chadian borders are suffering the real apocalypse.

In this paper, I would try first to present Sudan in general and especially the region of Darfur, as to throw a preliminary background of the crisis, where I will lay on some generic sources. Then, I would talk about the conflict, its causes and give a diagnosis of what is happening now after the UN involvement in the issue from the UN missions’ reports, Secretary General reports and other trustworthy NGOs. The third part of the paper would tackle with the Sudanese position and interests in this crisis, relaying mainly on the Sudanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs web site and Sudanese leaders declarations to the media.

I

Sudan situated in Northern Africa and bordering the Red Sea, Covers the 2.505.824 Km², which makes it the larger state in Africa. Because of it size, Sudan border many African countries: “Central African Republic 1,165 km, Chad 1,360 km, Democratic Republic of the Congo 628 km, Egypt 1,273 km, Eritrea 605 km, Ethiopia 1,606 km, Kenya 232 km, Libya 383 km, Uganda 435 km.”(www.cia.gov, CIA fact book). As Sudan lies in the Tropics and is quite completely landlocked, it has a tropical Climate in the south, arid desert in the north, whereas a rain varies by regions and seasons. As regards its physical features, Sudan is mainly flat apart from some mountains in the south, northeast and west. Yet, the desert dominates the north. Sudan has a rich amount of natural resources; “petroleum, gold, small reserves of iron ore, copper, chromium ore, zinc, silver, hydropower…” (Atlas of the Earth) But most of these resources remained largely unexploited until the Chinese came. One of the most important issues in this apparent balanced image is environmental issues which caused ethnic and national disputes like: inadequate supplies of potable water, soil erosion, desertification and periodic drought explains the CIA world Fact book.
The Sudanese population was more than 41 million inhabitants in July 2006, mostly between 0 and 14 years old, which is low compared to the large area Sudan covers. This population is constituted by many ethnic groups: Black 52%, Arabs 39%, Beja 6% and foreigners 2%. Among this population there is 70% of Sunni Muslims situated in the north, 25% indigenous believers and 5% of Christians situated in the south and Khartoum. (www.cia.gov, CIA World Fact Book). The Arabization program did not kill native languages and dialects like: Ta Badawie, Sudanic, Nilotic and Nubian…

Sudan’s economy is an emergent fragile economy that lived a huge change after the starting of oil exportation but is still facing many agricultural troubles. “Sudan has turned around a struggling economy with sound economic policies and infrastructure investments, but it still faces formidable economic problems, starting from its low level of per capita output. From 1997 to date, Sudan has been implementing IMF macroeconomic reforms. In 1999, Sudan began exporting crude oil and in the last quarter of 1999 recorded its first trade surplus, which, along with monetary policy, has stabilized the exchange rate. Increased oil production, revived light industry, and expanded export processing zones helped sustain GDP growth at 8.6% in 2004. Agricultural production remains Sudan's most important sector, employing 80% of the work force, contributing 39% of GDP, and accounting for most of GDP growth, but most farms remain rain-fed and susceptible to drought. Chronic instability - resulting from the long-standing civil war between the Muslim north and the Christian/pagan south, adverse weather, and weak world agricultural prices - ensure that much of the population will remain at or below the poverty line for years.”(CIA World Fact Book)

Politically, since its independence from UK in 1956, Sudan’s political scene was dominated by Military Islamic regime, which doesn’t take into considerations the diverse components especially the non-Arabs and non-Muslims living in the south. Consequently, the country sunk into two long civil wars during the second half of the last century. The first civil war lasted till 1983. The second war and famine affected more than 4 million people, in the crisis of the South. The crisis lasted in a final Nayvasha peace treaty of January 2005, which granted the southern rebels autonomy for six years, after which a referendum for independence would be held. At the same time another sensitive crisis acquired in the Darfur region in 2003, which we will deal with in more details. Sudan also, suffers from refugees problems, and is waiting for crucial national elections for 2008 - 2009. (Human Rights Watch Africa)

II

The Darfur conflict is not as simple as it seems, as it rots go back to the bitter history of magnetization of the non-Arab and non-Muslims by Khartoum, and because many actors are involved in the issue. Such that, the conflict began when years of drought touched the miserable region of Darfur, which means (Land of the Fur) in 2003, when rebel group influenced by John Guarang began attacking government targets and fertile private exploitations, as they were claiming that the region was being neglected by Khartoum and left in famine because of there non-Arab origins. Since then, the arid land of “Darfur has been facing many years of tensions over fertile land between nomadic Arabs from one hand and farmers from the Fur, Massaleet and Zagawa communities” (www.bbc.com). On the land of conflict there are two main rebel groups: the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). In addition to these two, there is the National Redemption Front, led by Ahmed Diraige, which units the groups opposed to the May Peace Treaty initiated by the government of Khartoum. From its side the government mobilized “self-defense militias” as they like to call them. But quickly these militias lucked of discipline and start seeking their own interests and became what is called the Janjaweed. “Refugees from Darfur say that following air raids by government aircraft, the Janjaweed ride into villages on horses and camels, slaughtering men, raping women and stealing whatever they can find Many women report being abducted by the Janjaweed and held as sex slaves for more than a week before being released.” (Human Rights Wash report) However Sudanese government denies any relations with these groups or having any control over them. Yet after international pressure and the threats of sanctions, they promised to disarm the Janjaweed. Under such conditions about 200.000 Sudanese flee as refugees to Chad, which causes a huge diplomatic problem between the two countries. Especially, with the persistent Janjaweed threat over the 600 km of borders where the refugees’ camps lay in a disastrous humanitarian conditions. Non Sudanese actors are trying to save the situation. “About 7,000 African Union troops have slowly been deployed in Darfur on a very limited mandate. Experts say the soldiers are too few to cover an area the size of France, and the African Union says it does not have the money to fund the operation for much longer. Sudan has resisted strong western diplomatic pressure for the UN to take control of the peacekeeping mission. The latest plan (resolution 1706) envisages 17,000 troops and 3,000 UN policemen.”(www.un.org, secretary general report). In addition to that United Nations Mission in Sudan is very active in helping refugees, and international help and NGOs started acting to improve the situation there.

III

As far as the Sudanese Government position is concerned it is clear that, Sudan is in a sensitive situation especially after the potential losing of its southern rich countries in the coming referendum. Sudanese government is also waiting for crucial elections within two years, and by allowing a foreign intervention in the Darfur crisis it will menace to throw the public opinion against the Islamic regime, that many see as illegitimate. Economically, the government is very friendly with China, that has an exclusive right to exploit the Sudanese oil, but in the Darfur Regions the populations are more sympathizing with the American which supplies them with food. With the American in Darfur the Chinese interests are being menaced and so are the government interests and image. The government also committed a huge mistake by constituting the Janjaweed, thinking it will be cheaper. And now they are paying the hard price, as their image at the international level is very bad. So Sudan continued refusing the UN resolution, and playing the card of sovereignty, but was forced to accept them to avoid a regular international intervention. Especially with the Chad involved and backed up by the French army. In the Sudanese Foreign ministry web site we can read the following headlines: “there is a deep engagement to fight organized terrorism… and support peace efforts and to improve our international cooperation in terms of economic development of our entire region” (www.mfa.gov.sd). Yet, it is clear that these idealistic words are far away from the bitter reality of the ruling process.

Until Resolution 1706 Sudan was calling for non violation of its Sovereignty and calling for the reinforcement of only African peace keeping troops, but the image of the humanitarian disaster are being more and more clear to the international community. The frustrations millions of Sudanese have been leaving since 1956 may reach an end with the explosive file of Darfur and by the coming elections. But the price was bloody tragedies and decades of marginalization.

Reference List

-www.bbc.co.uk
-www.act.darfurgenocide.com
-www.hwr.org (human rights watch)
-www.mfa.gov.sd (Sudanese Ministry of Foreign affairs)
-www.un.org (United Nations)
-www.crimesofwar.org
-www.sudan.net
-www.unmis.org (United Nations Mission in Sudan)
-www.cia.gov (American Central Intelligence Agency, The World fact Book)
-Atlas of the Earth: ‘the Marshall Cavendish Illustrated Encyclopedia’, London & New York (1990).

“Morocco resemble to a tree whose roots are deeply immersed in the African land, and which breath thanks to its foliage shift following the winds of Europe[translation mine]” (Hassan II, 1976, p. 189). This statement by king Hassan illustrates how the Moroccan kingdom in constantly turned to the west for historical, political, economical as well as military reasons. This attachment to the west is synonymous for Morocco to a range of strong ties with its major western partners: Spain, France and USA. Spain shares many centuries of common history with Morocco, when the Cherifian kingdom ruled Andalusia. But Spain is also is the country that colonized Morocco for the longest amount of time till 1975 and is still present on the Moroccan soil through Ceuta & Mellilia. France from its part, has vary particular relations with its past colony, since Moroccans fought on the French side during war and inherited many juridical administrative and economical cultural aspects of France. Moroccan American relations go back to 1777 when Morocco was one of the first states to recognize the United States as an independent country. Furthermore, the 1787 Treaty of Peace and Friendship between the two countries remains the longest unbroken US treaty. This relations with all of Spain, France and the US are translated into a political, economical and military cooperation which has gone throughout periods of total accord of interests and some phases of discord. In this article I will try to analyze Morocco’s relations with Spain, France and the US, and I’ll try to highlight the different interests that regulate this relations following the particularity of each of these countries and of the historical moment and the national interests which dictate this relations since 1956.

Morocco and Spain live in a geographical “face to face”, which implies relations that none of the two countries can never avoid. Morocco’s political priority after independence was to recuperate the rest of the land still occupied by the Spanish, so it got back gradually Tarfaya in 1958, then Ifny in 1969 and the Western Sahara after the Green March and the Madrid treaty in 1975. Yet, the two cities of Ceuta and Mellilia are still a sensitive political issue between the two neighbors “The presence of two small Spanish cities on the coast of North Africa remains an underlying source of friction between Morocco and Spain, despite the long-standing nature of the Iberian presence. Ceuta ,at the entrance to the striates opposite the rock of Gibraltar, was taken by Portugal in 1415, was affected by the Portuguese-Spanish union of 1580-1640 and was ceded subsequently to Spain in 1668 ” (Richard Gillespie 2000, 66). Spain argues that Ceuta and Mellilia were Spanish before the establishment of the nowadays modern Morocco, whereas Morocco compare the case of the two cities to Gibraltar, the British rock, claimed by Spain as being part of its territory. But Morocco’s politic towards the two cities is very much varied, first because Morocco is military weaker than its northern neighbor and because Morocco is engaged in the Western Sahara affair and can’t open two political fronts at once, moreover, even the citizens of Ceuta and Mellilia enjoy more living under the flag of the Spanish 6 th world power than joining the still struggling for development Morocco. However the two cities are seen by the Moroccan foreign politicians as a political pressure card, which can serve the Moroccan interests in certain conflicts that could oppose the two countries such as the Sahara conflict. Which leads us to the Spanish position on the Sahara issue, as the colonizer of that north African territory since The Protectorate Treaty of March 1912, dividing Morocco into French, Spanish and international zones. The Spanish called for a referendum on 1974 about the Western Sahara, that was “terra nullus” according to them, since then continued to support the cause of the SADR directly or indirectly maintaining its position about a “fair referendum” for the Sahraoui people. Spain also helped in the international recognition of the conflict from the Polisario’s point of view by its medias and strong NGOs. To understand the Spanish position we should consider three factors, the first is to keep Morocco busy with the Sahara so it won’t be able to officially claim Ceuta and Mellilia, the second is about a certain historical/psychological fear of a united strong Morocco, which may invade Andalusia one day, the last is about making pressure on Morocco as to get better advantages on the fishing treaty which millions of Spanish fishers depend on. The Fishing treaty is one of the main lines of the Spanish Moroccan economical relations. According to Hernando De Laramandy “One of the favors Morocco gave to Spain within the Madrid treaty was fishing rights between 15 and 20 years, to 800 Spanish ship in all of Mediterranean, Atlantic and Saharian waters” (De Laramandy 2005, 326), this great favor was in exchange of the ending of the Spanish colonial era in Morocco and was followed by two other treaties in 1975, 1977 and 1983. Yet in 1986 Spain joined the European Union, so it’s agricultural exportations towards the other EU countries shadowed the Moroccan ones, which pushed Morocco to renegotiate the fishing treaty, but this time directly with the EU in February 1988, before the shift of the late 90s when Morocco refused to renew the treaty. As a result, this led to an important political crisis, illustrated by the Spanish support to the SADR and the crisis of the little rock called Leila . In fact, Spain joining the EU was of direct impact on Moroccan economy as all the country’s main exportations started passing through the Spanish state, which has quite the same kind of agricultural and manufactured production, this pushed the Spanish government to impose more restrictions on the Moroccan exportation, which generated the famous Tomato Crisis because the Spanish customs officers let the Moroccan products pending until it was spoiled.
Despite this economical interest conflicts, Spain remains Morocco’s second economical partner and importer and th fourth foreign investor in Morocco as well as one of the most important loan donor (De Laramandy 2005, 350-354). In addition to that, the clandestine trade between the two countries generates millions of dollars annually. At the militarily level , Moroccan Spanish relations are the perfect form of cooperation, thus Spain gave Morocco different loans to equip and supply its military segment. Gillespie said “During the Gonzalez period, there were strong ethical objections to the use of development aid (FAD) credits to finance Moroccan military purchases from Spain. Between 1977 and 1994, Morocco was the third largest recipient of these credits, after China and Mexico, and one quarter of the sum conceded to Rabat was used to purchase Spanish military equipment” (Gillespie 2000, 57). Also king Hassan’s visit to Spain in 1989 opened the opportunity of a bilateral defense agreement as Gillespie explains “From 1984, there were joint military exercises, at first involving the air forces, then the navies and finally the armies of the two countries. During King Hassan’s visit to Spain in 1989, this activity was consolidated by a bilateral defense agreement which also provided for annual meetings, exchange visits, training corporation, joined production of military materiel and common programs to develop arming systems” (Gillespie 2000, 55). However, the Moroccan Spanish relations remain very fragile because of political conflict of interests as we’ve seen, and the best example to illustrate that is the Leila island’s crisis.

France and Morocco seem to be doomed for good collaboration and strong never-ending alliance. Morocco is very much related to France, culturally because most of its elites studied in France. Linguistically, as Morocco belongs to the francophone family. Economically since the Moroccan economical structure depends on the French one. And most of all, historically because of the colonial era, which was characterized by the special treatment of the French to the Moroccan case during colonization. We notice that, while France was exerting direct ruling over Algeria and Tunisia, it has maintained the Moroccan Monarchy even after 1912 treaty. Also, Morocco fought on the French side during the World War by serving as a land of meeting for the Allies during the Anfa Summit, and sending Moroccan soldiers to fight with the colonizer (Berramdane 1987, 20). Politically, Morocco counts on the French perpetual support to defend the Cherifian Kingdom at the European Union and the United Nations to take its territorial aspirations to a international level, in spite of the mild crisis that divided the two countries during the mandate of De Gaulle of after the assassination of Mehdi Ben Barka. Even if France remains silent about the Western Sahara issue, it is obvious that France stands as a major Moroccan ally, by providing Morocco with financial, logistical and military aids. Here we should ask what does France gets in exchange of this services? Fist of all, France enjoys the prestige of being a sort of “God father” to its ex-colonies especially Morocco, and an active actor in the third world development. But France’s interest in Morocco is mainly economical, as it stands as the privileged economical partner with more than 40% of Morocco’s exportations going to France and its investments being on the top of Moroccan foreign investors lists. We can explain this strong economical partnership, not only by the strong political will, but more by the heritage of the 40 years of the French colonial existence in morocco, that made the Moroccan economy very much dependent on the French’s one. Moreover, Morocco is one of the most important workers’ provider to the aging France of the post war era and even now. In exchange, Morocco benefits from the foreign currency the Moroccan immigrants send regularly to their mother land. Yet, France fears the flourishing of the American interests over Morocco after the free trade convention, which menaces the French domination of the Moroccan economy. Military, France provided Morocco with military assistance to face the Polisario and Algerian threat, as Morocco associated these two entities with the U.R.S.S during the cold war as to get western support and to maintain the balance of power inside the region during the Cold War. To illustrate the French helps Damis says that “The total value of French arms sales to Morocco between 1974 and 1982 is probably in the range of $1, 5-2, 00 billion, not including weapons supply through credits…” (Damis 1985, 148). As a consequence of all these mutual interests, Moroccan French relation are characterized by deep historical roots, translated by good friendship relations and common interests.

Official discourse often relate Moroccan American relations to the 18 th century Moroccan recognition of th USA as an independent state from the British empire. Yet, in our realistic world governed by mutual interests we can interpret the Moroccan American relations according to political, economic and military factors. Politically, Morocco served as an intermediate between the East and the West, as Morocco tried to highlight its quality of being a tolerant country and the fact that the Moroccan king is the Al Quods Committee’s president. However, the Camp David treaties gave to the US a new ally inside the middle east which contributed in the Diplomatic isolation of the Morocco of the 80s. Still, the US is counting today on Morocco as a regional stabilizer in north Africa and a sure soldier in the region on US war against terrorism (Selected Papers 2003). But Morocco is one of the exporters of the extremist terrorists, if we consider the number of Moroccan terrorists involved in the terrorist attempts since 2001, which weakens its position on this subject. In return, Morocco count on the US for supporting it’s territorial issue among the international community. Nowadays, after the collapse of the Berlin Wall, US does not intervene on Morocco’s side on the Sahara conflict directly, because the Algerian oil and gas are more valuable for the American interests, thus US plan through the Marshal Plan to build a peaceful atmosphere in the region for prosperous economical exchange. US has for a long time avoided north Africa as to not interfere in what is considered as a French economical territory, so till the late 90s the trade rates between Morocco and USA remained very low. In 2004, “the Free Trade Treaty which anointed Morocco as a Special Ally outside the NATO, and gave Morocco very comfortable trading terms” (De Laramandy 2005, 402) is a kind of standing point in the relations between Rabat and Washington, even if king Hassan has said before “that US can never replace France” (Hassan II 1993, 53). The free trade came in a historical moment where US needed Morocco as a gate keeper against terrorism, while Morocco was aiming to expend its economical horizons outside the European island after the structural adjustments of the late 80s. The US Moroccan Military cooperation was strengthened by the Carter and Regan government, even if 5 military American bases were in Morocco since the 50s, as the USA provided Morocco with different kinds of armaments and trained the Moroccan army in many occasions, because during the Cold War Morocco was the Western castle in north Africa, whereas all of Algeria, Libya and Egypt were more pro-communists. Parker said about this military aids “that the United States is trying to build up a position of military strength in Morocco” (Parker 1987, 161). Morocco was more than happy with the American gifts, as it served in the long Moroccan Algerian Polisario conflict, in addition to the Saudian funds that served in baying arms from the US. To illustrate the huge amount of loans and aids spent in Morocco by the US Zoubair & Zunes explain that “Morocco has, since independence in 1956, received more US aid than any other Arab country except Egypt. Indeed, since the beginning of the war over Western Sahara in 1975, Morocco has obtained more than one fifth of all US aid to Africa, totaling more than 1$ billion in military assistance alone. The United States played a major role in reversing the war over Western Sahara to Morocco’s favor through large-scale economic and military aid, military advisors, and logistical assistance”(Zoubair & Zunes 1999, 234). US Moroccan relations, as we see ,are purely based on pragmatic mutual interests, which varies following the historical events.

During the reign of Hassan II the branches of the Moroccan tree have reached the heart of the west, as foreign policy was one of the sovereign’s priorities. Consequently, Morocco has built strong ties with all of France, Spain and the U.S for mutual interests. Yet, the Moroccan tree nowadays is more turned to its inner matters to build a better Morocco from the inside, able to stand as a high-ranking negotiator face to the West.

REFERENCE LIST

- De Laramandy 2005 / Zoubair & Zunes 1999 /
Parker 1987 / Damis 1985 / Berramdane 1987 /
Gillespie 2000 / Hassan II, 1976 (...)